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Like many other transitional democracies, South Africa has chosen to run its two
national postapartheid elections by an independent electoral commission, not by the
existing government. Although the results were widely considered legitimate, the
perception of legitimacy was due in large part to the public's low expectations. To
keep the public confidence, and to avoid the sorts of large-scale breakdowns in the
electoral process that might undermine it, the current Electoral Commission must
embrace major reforms. One of the Electoral Commission's most pressing
problems is the fact that opposition parties believe it is strongly biased in favor of
the ruling political party, the African National Congress. The Electoral Commis-
sion also has failed to devolve meaningful power to provincial officials, increasing
the risk that it will botch the details of election management. The author proposes
several measures to help resolve these concerns.
INTRODUCTION
One of the most important tasks facing a nation aspiring to be-
come a consolidated democracy' is to design electoral machinery that
produces free and fair elections. 2 The initial transition to democracy
"! B.S.B.A., Georgetown University, 1999; J.D., New York University School of Law,
2002. I would like to thank Professor Christina Murray at the University of Cape Town
and Professor Rick Pildes at the New York University School of Law for their guidance
and input on my Note. I also would like to thank Alison Mikkor for being a constant
sounding board for ideas throughout the research and writing process.
I Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan explain that a nation's democratic consolidation is com-
plete upon acquiring three attributes: Behavioral consolidation requires that no major ele-
ment of society work towards establishment of a nondemocratic regime; attitudinal
consolidation demands that a strong majority of people favor democracy as the best gov-
erning system; constitutional consolidation occurs when there is a societal commitment to
dispute resolution within the apparatus of the democratic state. Juan J. Linz & Alfred
Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South
America, and Post-Communist Europe 5-6 (1996).
2 While there is no agreed upon international definition of "free and fair elections,"
Arvid Bro Thuetsad and Camilla Selch define a free election in terms of the "freedom and
opportunity of the voters in question to associate in political parties and to propagate poli-
cies of their choice without coercion and restriction of any kind." Arvid Bro Thuetsad &
Camilla Selch, What Do We Mean by Free and Fair Elections?, in South African Election
Update: November 1998-June 1999, at 13, 13 (Bob Jones ed., 2000). Fairness requires
"equal opportunities for the exercise of political freedom for both individuals and groups,"
including equal opportunity for parties "to win the support of the electorate." Id. Danish
political scientists Jrgen Elklit and Palle Svensson acknowledge that, so defined, "free"
and "fair" are difficult to keep analytically separate. See id. This definition will be used
for the purposes of this Note. But cf. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
1157
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is complete only once a government elected by free and fair means
has de facto and de jure authority to run the country.3 If democratic
consolidation is to follow, there must be a deepening commitment to
democracy in the law and among the people. This commitment in
turn depends upon free elections as a necessary, although insufficient,
condition.4 Elections play this central role in democratic development
because democratic leaders derive their authority to rule from public
confidence-that they are the choice of the majority of voters.5
Many transitional democracies have shied away from the election
administration model favored by developed democracies, where elec-
tions are run by government bodies and disputes are adjudicated by
the judiciary.6 For public confidence in their results, government-ad-
ministered elections depend upon an independent and impartial civil
service and judiciary, neither of which exist in many new democra-
Dec. 19, 1966, art. 25(b), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 179 (defining free and fair elections in terms of
citizen's right to "vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by
universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free ex-
pression of the will of the electors").
3 Linz & Stepan, supra note 1, at 3.
4 See id. at 4 (cautioning against "electoralist fallacy," which fails to see free elections
as only part of consolidation).
5 Leaders of established democracies also derive legitimacy from the perception that
they were the choice of the people. One legal scholar analyzing the 2000 presidential elec-
tion in the United States has argued that the United States Supreme Court's decision to
halt the Florida recount deprived George W. Bush of public confidence that he won at the
ballot box, thereby reducing confidence in the "legitimacy of his election." See Michael W.
McConnell, Two-and-a-Half Cheers for Bush v Gore, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 657, 660-61 (2001)
(arguing that remand to Florida Supreme Court to attempt recount in line with constitu-
tional standards would have "reassur[ed]" American people as to legitimacy of winner).
Public confidence that leaders were selected in free and fair elections is even more impor-
tant in emerging democracies, which lack alternative public institutions (such as the Su-
preme Court) with sufficient credibility to imbue leaders with legitimacy. Cf. Why It
Matters, The Economist, Mar. 9, 2002, at 12 (characterizing Robert Mugabe's motivation
for undermining democratic processes in Zimbabwe as desire to combine power of dictator
with legitimacy of democratic leader).
6 For example, the United Kingdom uses various government bodies to administer
elections. The Home Office in England (like its counterparts in Scotland and Northern
Ireland) oversees the electoral law using county sheriffs, the mayor of London, chairmen
of district councils, a chief electoral officer, or local authority officers as returning officers.
Constitutional Assembly, Republic of South Africa, Theme Committee Six: Workshop of
Election Commission (May 22, 1995) (submission by Justice Z.R. Chesoni, Chairman,
Electoral Commission of Kenya) (on file with Constitutional Assembly database and the
New York University Law Review). Returning officers are responsible for prepoll plan-
ning, conducting the actual elections, and counting and reporting of votes. H.F. Rawlings,
Law and the Electoral Process 213 (1988). Boundary Commissions composed of High
Court judges, appointees of the Home Secretary, and appointees of the Secretary of State
for the Environment draw parliamentary constituency boundaries. Id. at 18-20. Electoral
petitions, or challenges to election results or practices, are made to Election Courts com-
posed of two High Court judges. Id. at 221.
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cies. 7 Instead, aspiring democracies have employed electoral commis-
sions to manage elections, 8 hoping that granting responsibility for
managing the electoral process to an independent institution will en-
sure free and fair results.9
However, merely creating an electoral commission to administer
elections does not create public confidence in election results.10
Rather, the constitution or enabling legislation must give an electoral
commission some combination of legislative," administrative, 12 and
adjudicative powers,13 with two principal requirements of credible
election administration in mind. First, for election results to be fair,
7 See John Murphy, An Independent Electoral Commission, in Free and Fair Elections
25, 25-26 (Nico Steytler et al. eds., 1994) (criticizing use of government department to
administer election absent independent civil service and judiciary). The legitimacy of gov-
ernment-administered elections also may depend on the division of election responsibilities
between unrelated government departments, creating internal checks and balances to sub-
stitute for the external check of an electoral commission. See Chesoni, supra note 6, at 13
(describing checks and balances in UK election administration).
8 Eastern European countries, including Hungary, Slovenia, Romania, Poland, Czech-
oslovakia, Bulgaria, and Russia all used electoral commissions in their postcommunist
transitional elections. See Peter Harris, Presentation to Theme Committee Six, South Af-
rican Constitutional Assembly 7 (1995) (on file with the New York University Law Re-
view). They also played a positive role in difficult elections in Bangladesh in 1991 and in
Ghana in 1992. Id.
9 See Murphy, supra note 7, at 35 (discussing how electoral commission can ensure
free and fair results).
10 For example, section 61 of Zimbabwe's Constitution creates the Electoral Supervi-
sory Commission (ESC) to supervise elections. See Zimb. Const. § 61. Its strictly limited
powers, however, prevent it from serving as an effective monitor of the electoral process.
Murphy, supra note 7, at 36. In fact, the ESC aided President Robert Mugabe's efforts to
improperly influence the March 2002 presidential elections by increasing polling sites in
rural, progovernment areas and decreasing voting stations in more opposition-friendly cit-
ies. Rachel L. Swains, New Rules in Zimbabwe Likely to Aid Mugabe's Side, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 7, 2002, at A4. As a result, many opposition voters waited ten to fifteen hours to cast
their ballots, Rachel L. Swarns, Mugabe's Aides Declare Him Winner of Zimbabwe Vote,
N.Y. Times, Mar. 14, 2002, at A3, while others never cast their ballots at all, helping
Mugabe to victory. Rachel L. Swarns, Mugabe Holds Large Lead in Election in
Zimbabwe, N.Y. Times, Mar. 13, 2002, at A5.
11 Legislative powers can include drafting the electoral act itself, advising on electoral
legislation pending before the legislature, and creating regulations to implement legislation
passed by a legislature. Murphy, supra note 7, at 43; see also Larry Garber, Nat'l Demo-
cratic Inst. for Int'l Affairs, Election Commissions: Responsibilities and Composition 2-3
(no date) (on file with the New York University Law Review) (noting range of legislative
powers assigned electoral commissions internationally).
12 See Murphy, supra note 7, at 44-45 (detailing potential administrative roles of electo-
ral commissions, including control over creation of voters' roll, registration of parties, se-
lection of election personnel, and monitoring of election behavior).
13 See id. at 45-50 (discussing potential adjudicative powers, including declaration of
election results and determination of election violations). The scope of adjudicative pow-
ers assigned electoral commissions varies widely from such countries as Zimbabwe, where
electoral commissions have no role and where the ordinary courts adjudicate election dis-
putes, to countries such as Haiti where the electoral commission has the power to cancel
elections. Id. at 46.
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the commission must be independent and impartial. 14 In order for the
commission to be insulated from the political process, an alternative
mechanism for political accountability is necessary to constrain the
commission's expenditure of public funds. 15 Second, the administra-
tion of the election must be efficient, or free from administrative or
technical breakdowns, to prevent charges of manipulation of results
from undermining confidence in the election. 16
Emerging from decades of white minority rule,17 South Africa
has held two postapartheid elections, first in 1994 and again in 1999.
In each election it employed an electoral commission, in part to lend
credibility to the election results.18
At first glance, it would appear that the commissions have been
successful in this task, as most groups inside and outside of South Af-
rica accepted the election results as legitimate. 19 However, the source
of public confidence in the election results was not the existence of
efficient, independently managed elections.20 Rather, such accept-
ance was due to forgiveness of electoral-process deficiencies by a
14 See Harris, supra note 8, at 3 (including independence and impartiality among re-
quirements for effective election administration). If fair elections require "equal opportu-
nities for the exercise of political freedom for individuals and groups," a nonpartisan
electoral commission's impartiality is essential to guarantee "equal opportunities" and thus
a fair election. Thuetsad & Selch, supra note 30, at 13.
15 See Kader Asmal, Editorial, Kriegler Strikes at the Government with a Broken
Sword, Sunday Times (Johannesburg), Jan. 31, 1999, http://www.suntimes.co.za/1999/01/31/
insight/in06.htm (opining that even independent agencies must be held accountable "to
safeguard public funds"). Independent agencies also must be checked to ensure that deci-
sions are rational and comply with the law. Those familiar with the American legal system
would assume that courts fill that role. See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Costs and Benefits of
Aggressive Judicial Review of Agency Action, 1989 Duke L.J. 522, 522 (contending "most
obvious goal" for judicial review of administrative agency action is ensuring agency compli-
ance with legislative commands). However, in South Africa, the judiciary lacked sufficient
credibility to play such a role. See infra notes 34-35, 56 and accompanying text.
16 See Harris, supra note 8, at 3-4 (identifying importance of efficiency to credibility of
electoral process). Administrative breakdowns that undermine the credibility of election
results corrode the foundation upon which the legitimacy of a democratic leader's rule
rests. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (explaining that legitimacy of democratic
leaders depends upon public confidence that such leaders are choice of people).
17 On apartheid, see generally Segregation and Apartheid in Twentieth-Century South
Africa (William Beinart & Saul Dubow eds., 1995); South Africa: From Apartheid to Na-
tional Unity, 1981-1994 (William Gutteridge ed., 1995).
18 The specific political conditions surrounding the creation of each commission influ-
enced both its structure and the scope of powers ceded it by the government. See discus-
sion infra Parts I.A.1, II.A.1.
19 See infra notes 64, 175-76 and accompanying text. But cf. infra note 185 and accom-
panying text (remarking on higher rate of distrust of electoral institutions among nonblack
voters).
20 Both elections were characterized by large-scale administrative breakdowns-which
affected the accuracy of results-and by severe incursions into commission independence
by political elites. See discussion infra Parts I.B, II.C.
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country happy to be governed by liberation leaders.21 As social con-
sensus fades, continued public confidence in election results will de-
pend upon the credibility of the electoral process.22 Not only must the
commission improve its performance to meet escalating expecta-
tions,23 it must do so now, to develop sufficient institutional credibility
to ensure future compliance with controversial decisions.24
This Note examines South Africa's two postapartheid electoral
commissions at work. It looks at the institutional-design choices that
went into formulating the two bodies and reviews the problems that
resulted from these decisions. Finally, this Note presents some sug-
gestions for institutional reform. Part I describes the powers and
structure of the transitional Independent Electoral Commission
(IEC). It evaluates the IEC's performance in the 1994 elections, iden-
tifying both deficiencies that needed to be addressed in a permanent
body and some solutions offered to those defects. Part II continues
with a description of the constitutional and legal framework for the
permanent Electoral Commission (EC), focusing on the difficulties
the government and the EC had in defining the terms of their rela-
tionship, and the Constitutional Court's attempt to resolve this dis-
pute. It then analyzes the performance of the EC in the 1999
elections, again noting institutional problem areas in need of reform.
Part III proposes concrete reforms South Africa should adopt to ad-
21 See Steven Friedman & Louise Stack, The Magic Moment: The 1994 Election, in 7
South African Review: The Small Miracle: South Africa's Negotiated Settlement 301, 325
(Steven Friedman & Doreen Atkinson eds., 1994) (describing South Africa as "forgiving
and forgetting" failures of Independent Electoral Commission (IEC)).
22 Zimbabwe is an example of this phenomenon. As social consensus supporting Presi-
dent Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF)
splintered, Zimbabweans turned to the electoral process to register their dissatisfaction
with Mugabe's rule. See Rachel L. Swarns, Zimbabwe Vote Heralds Shift in Southern
Africa, N.Y. Times, Mar. 9, 2002, at A3 (commenting on "healthy trend" of citizens partici-
pating in vigorous, multiparty democracy). The broad intimidation and fraud wreaked by
Mugabe supporters destroyed confidence in the election results, although fear of an army
crackdown prevented widespread protests. See Rachel L. Swarns, Zimbabwe Moderate
Offers Assurances to the Opposition, N.Y. Times, Mar. 14, 2002, at A8.
23 See, e.g., Indep. Electoral Comm'n, The South African Elections of April 1994, at 84
(1994) ("In the glow of elections of national reconciliation the electorate was indulgent. Its
forbearance should not be tried again.").
24 One measure of electoral-commission legitimacy is whether parties who disagree
with a decision of the body nevertheless comply. Cf. John C. Yoo, In Defense of the
Court's Legitimacy, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 775,776-77 (2001) (defining institutional legitimacy
as "the belief in the binding nature of an institution's decisions, even when one disagrees
with them"). An electoral commission, which, like a court, cannot implement a decision
physically, will only be able to gain such legitimacy by making decisions based on reasoned
procedures that are viewed as plausibly fair and just. Cf. Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 866 (1992) (explaining U.S. Supreme Court's legitimacy as product of "mak-
ing legally principled decisions under circumstances in which their principled character is
sufficiently plausible to be accepted by the Nation").
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dress the problems identified in Parts I and II, changes that need to
occur before the EC's failures begin to undermine the credibility of
election results.
I
THE 1994 INDEPENDENT ELECTORAL COMMISSION
The 1994 IEC was an unusual institution, as it was designed to
supplant the state in administering an election without enlisting inter-
national support. 25 This Part explores that Commission in detail. Part
L.A considers the factors that led to the creation of a parallel state to
administer the transitional election and describes how the Indepen-
dent Electoral Commission Act (IEC Act) 150 of 199326 structured
this vast institution. Part LB evaluates the IEC's performance in the
transitional election. Part I.C then draws upon these experiences to
identify problem areas in the IEC's performance and some potential
solutions.
A. Creating a Parallel State: Formation of the IEC
1. Rationale Behind the IEC
The 1994 South African elections were part of the transition to a
constitutional democracy supporting multiple parties.27 They were
South Africa's first ever nonracial elections; apartheid South Africa
had held numerous elections based on a racially restricted franchise. 28
Under the previous dispensation, the Department of Home Affairs
(DHA), a government ministry, administered elections pursuant to an
electoral law passed by Parliament. 29 The DHA-administered elec-
25 See Friedman & Stack, supra note 21, at 302.
26 Independent Electoral Commission Act 150 of 1993.
27 See Thuetsad & Selch, supra note 2, at 15 (characterizing electoral transition as
"[t]he goal for the 1994 election").
28 The Natives Representation Act of 1936 took away the right to vote for the few
thousand Africans who had the right at that time. Tim Nuttall et al., From Apartheid to
Democracy: South Africa 1948-1994, at 15-16, 33 (1999). The subsequent Separate Repre-
sentation of Voters Act of 1956 did the same for "coloureds," or mixed-race voters. Id. at
33-34. The 1983 constitution created houses of Parliament for coloureds and Indians, but
legislation could be passed without the assent of those houses. See S. Afr. Const. (Repub-
lic of South Africa Constitution Act 110, 1983) § 32 (giving President's Council, which was
composed of majority white delegates pursuant to section 70 of that Act, power to pass
legislation where houses could not agree). Blacks continued to be denied the franchise.
See § 52 (granting right to vote to "white," "coloured," and "Indian" voters, but not to
blacks).
29 Murphy, supra note 7, at 25. Election disputes were adjudicated by the provincial
division of the Supreme Court for the province in which the dispute arose, with leave to
appeal to the appellate division. §§ 180 to 181 of Electoral Act 45 of 1979.
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tions were at least efficient, with results that enjoyed legitimacy even
among the supporters of white opposition parties.30
However competent the apartheid government was in administer-
ing whites-only elections, no one on the Kempton Park Technical
Committee drafting the IEC Act advocated that the DHA retain its
role.3 ' There were at least three reasons why this was the case. First,
while the DHA had run elections efficiently for three million voters
from common socioeconomic backgrounds, the transitional election
had a potential electorate more than seven times as large (twenty-two
million),32 with the vast majority of voters exercising the franchise for
the first time. The postapartheid DHA admitted that despite its expe-
rience in running apartheid elections, it did not have sufficient institu-
tional capacity to run multiracial elections. 33 Second, and more
important, any election administered by the apartheid government
was unlikely to enjoy legitimacy in the eyes of the people. By ad-
ministering and enforcing oppressive, racially biased policies passed
by a racially restricted legislature, the civil service and judiciary lacked
the necessary imprimatur of impartiality and independence.3 4 The re-
sulting lack of popular confidence in the government institutions de-
nied the DHA the support it needed to run postapartheid elections.35
30 See Khehla Shubane, Centre for Policy Studies, Exploring Some Ideas on the Con-
duct of Future Elections: Some Thoughts 2 (1995) (on file with Constitutional Assembly
database and the New York University Law Review) (noting that English-speaking opposi-
tion parties did not protest conduct of election officials despite decades of National Party
(NP) rule). The Conservative Party, an Afrikaans-speaking opposition party, did make
allegations of electoral fraud in the late 1980s. However, the courts did not find evidence
of wrongdoing in any one of the thirteen cases brought. See Claire Robertson, Contesting
the Contest: Negotiating the Election Machinery, in The Small Miracle: South Africa's
Negotiated Settlement, supra note 21, at 44, 48. Black political parties generally ignored
the outcome of white elections because, regardless of which party won, black interests
remained subjugated to white interests. See Shubane, supra, at 3.
31 See Robertson, supra note 25, at 50 (describing failure of apartheid government to
nominate member of committee in favor of strong Department of Home Affairs (DHA)
role). The technical committee at Kempton Park, site of transitional negotiations, was
composed of representatives of the National Party government, the African National Con-
gress (ANC), the Democratic Party, and the Inkatha Freedom Party. See id. at 47.
32 See Shubane, supra note 30, at 4.
33 See Dep't of Home Affairs, The Agency Responsible for the Conduct of Future
Elections 3 (no date) (on file with the New York University Law Review) (stating that
current DHA structures could not possibly deal with newly enlarged electorate).
34 See Murphy, supra note 7, at 25 (concluding that blurred distinction between govern-
ment and National Party made apartheid civil service and judiciary inappropriate referees);
see also Interview with Richard Rosenthal, Member, Kempton Park Technical Committee
on Electoral Commission, in Cape Town, S. Afr. (Oct. 25,2001) (transcript on file with the
New York University Law Review) ("Courts couldn't be trusted, the legislature could not
be trusted because it remained dominated by the National Party, and nor could the admin-
istration be trusted, because it was a product of its masters.").
35 See Murphy, supra note 7, at 25 (finding "decline in public support for the institu-
tions of government which [were] seen as illegitimate and unaccountable to the people").
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Third, the unique political climate at transition led both the ruling,
white minority National Party (NP) and the liberation African Na-
tional Congress (ANC) to favor creation of an electoral commission. 36
The NP, as the governing party, favored a larger role for the DHA,37
but it was strongly opposed to international administration of the
transitional election because it believed this would undermine na-
tional sovereignty.38 While the ANC was willing to agree to a South
African administrator, it would not allow that administrator to be the
apartheid government's DHA,39 making an electoral commission the
only politically acceptable alternative. 40
2. IEC Structure
The rationale behind the formation of a transitional electoral
commission played a large role in determining the scope of authority
given to the IEC. If the IEC was to supplant the discredited apartheid
state in managing the electoral process, it had to be afforded broad
legislative, administrative, and adjudicative powers. Accordingly, the
1993 IEC Act4' gave the IEC expansive authority to organize and ad-
minister the transitional elections. 42 It charged the body with deter-
36 The fact that both the NP and the ANC supported an electoral commission is surpris-
ing in light of political-process-lockup theory, which argues that political parties use their
current power to strengthen their hold on future power. See Samuel Issacharoff & Rich-
ard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 Stan. L.
Rev. 643, 673 (1998) (describing phenomenon in which dominant political party creates
electoral rules that prevent challenges from other parties). Given their divergent electoral
positions both at transition and for the future, support by both parties for an electoral
commission seems at first inconsistent with this theory. However, it appears that the ANC
and NP did seek to use their negotiating power in the transitional negotiations to
strengthen their respective electoral positions, with joint support for an electoral commis-
sion reflecting the lack of information about the behavior of the new electorate. Robert-
son, supra note 31, at 44.
37 See Robertson, supra note 31, at 48 (describing NP proposal to allow DHA to ad-
minister election with IEC ensuring it did so fairly).
38 See id. at 50.
39 See id. at 48 (explaining liberation parties' skepticism about neutrality of DHA). For
the ANC, the electoral commission would in essence serve as a "democracy branch,"
checking the impulse of the NP government to use its control over the electoral machinery
to manipulate the election results. See Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers,
113 Harv. L. Rev. 633, 718 (2000) (discussing use of electoral commissions as "democracy
branch" and as check on "predictable efforts by reigning politicians to entrench themselves
against popular reversals at the polls").
40 See Robertson, supra note 31, at 52 (calling electoral commission "trade off" be-
tween ANC and NP).
41 Independent Electoral Commission Act 150 of 1993.
42 Section 41 of the Independent Electoral Commission Act (IEC Act) 150 of 1993
granted the IEC sweeping regulatory power in nearly all areas related to the transitional
elections. § 41. These regulations took precedence over any conflicting parliamentary
acts. See John Murphy et al., Postscript-The Legal Framework of South Africa's First
Democratic Election, in Free and Fair Elections, supra note 7, at 240, 244 (explaining that
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mining the election results and then certifying whether those results
were the product of a "free and fair" election.43 To aid in its certifica-
tion process, the EEC was given the power to investigate and adjudi-
cate violations of election laws. 44
Allocating broad powers to the IEC was insufficient on its own to
ensure that election results would not be tainted by the residues of
apartheid. The major concern of the Kempton Park Technical Com-
mittee while drafting the IEC Act was protecting against interference
by the apartheid government, civil service, and, to a lesser extent, the
opposition parties, which would undermine the credibility of the
results.45
Accordingly, three sets of safeguards were employed to ensure
the IEC's independence. First, the IEC Act strictly regulated the
qualifications and behavior of the EEC commissioners.46 The Act
granted power to recommend commissioners to the interim Transi-
tional Executive Council,47 which comprised one member from each
political party.48 The Act required that the Council select commis-
sioners who were impartial, qualified to run an election, and lacking in
any "high party political profile[s]. ' '49 The Act also imposed limita-
since section l(xxxix) defines "Act" to include regulations made under it, section 34
supremacy clause extends to IEC regulations); see also Interview with Richard Rosenthal,
supra note 34 ("[T]he Commission was basically afforded the authority... to make the
subordinate legislation as it saw fit, to amend it and not have to submit to the approval of
the legislature.").
43 § 4(2) (listing objects of Commission). These objects also included conducting voter
education. § 4(2)(d).
44 See §§ 24(d), 28.
45 Richard Rosenthal, a member of the Kempton Park Technical Committee, which
drafted the IEC Act, explained that the primary concern of the Act was to make the IEC
"impervious to influence by any party competing in that election and in particular by the
governing party, which was the last apartheid government." Interview with Richard
Rosenthal, supra note 34.
46 See § 6 (detailing restrictions on commissioner behavior).
47 See § 5(1) (granting State President power to select commissioners based on advice
of Transitional Council).
48 § 4 of Transitional Executive Council Act 151 of 1993. The Council acted where
possible on the basis of consensus, giving small parties influence disproportionate to their
support in the population. See § 25 (requiring, where consensus is not possible, majority of
two-thirds to three-quarters for decision); see also Interview with Richard Rosenthal,
supra note 34 (asserting that "consensual process ... almost suspended the majoritarian
principle").
49 § 5(1) of Independent Electoral Commission Act 150 of 1993. Part of the reason for
excluding those with "high party political profile[s]" from the IEC was the desire to expand
the transitional process to include civil-society leaders, or leaders of autonomous institu-
tions outside of government and the parties. Murphy, supra note 7, at 29. In practice, the
shortage of individuals without political affiliation mandated selecting commissioners from
different political parties in the hope that their biases would "balance each other out."
Friedman & Stack, supra note 21, at 304.
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tions on commissioner employment after leaving the IEC 50 and lim-
ited removal of commissioners to situations of misconduct or
incapacity.51 Second, groups that had the potential to interfere with
the IEC's administration of the election were instead integrated into
the election process. The Kempton Park Technical Committee identi-
fied political parties as such groups.52 A Party Liaison Committee was
established as an outlet where the parties could mediate disputes
among themselves and with the IEC, without resorting to formal adju-
dication structures or violence.5 3 Third, the IEC Act gave the IEC
fiscal independence, or freedom from government attempts to use ap-
propriations (or the lack thereof), to influence IEC action.5 4
50 Commissioners could not hold an executive appointment or elected position in a
political party for eighteen months after leaving the IEC and could not serve in any legisla-
ture elected during their term on the Commission. § 6(2)(a), (h). The Act also initially
barred commissioners from service in state institutions, including appointments to any
branch of government or tertiary education institution, except to return to previously held
public office at the same level. This restriction subsequently was lifted. See § 1(b) of
Independent Electoral Commission Amendment Act 5 of 1994 (amending § 6(2)(a) of
Independent Electoral Commission Act of 1993).
51 See § 11(2) of Independent Electoral Commission Act 150 of 1993. Commissioners
could only be removed by the Special Electoral Court acting on the basis of an application
lodged by the President, the Transitional Executive Council, Parliament, or a political
party. See § 11(1). This provision insulated commissioners from politically motivated
removals.
52 See Interview with Richard Rosenthal, supra note 34 ("[T]he parties had to work
with the commission. There had to be a sort of collaboration at that level."). Given the
partisan history of the military and police force, the Committee also believed that integra-
tion of these groups was critical to avoiding a coup. See id. (discussing credible threat of
military coup). To mitigate this threat, the military and police were placed at the disposal
of the IEC. § 24(e). South Africa is not unique in giving an electoral commission some
control over the military in an attempt to control partisan behavior. Both the Philippines
and Guatemala gave their respective electoral commissions control over their politically
active militaries. Murphy, supra note 7, at 37.
53 See §§ 5 to 6 of Electoral Act 202 of 1993. The South African Party Liaison Commit-
tee was based in large part on a similar Election Council used to great effect in Southern
Rhodesia's (Zimbabwe's) 1980 transitional election. See Murphy, supra note 7, at 30-32
(describing Rhodesian system and noting its potential application in South Africa).
54 See §§ 16 to 17 of Independent Electoral Commission Act 150 of 1993 (guaranteeing
IEC "necessary resources" to complete task and naming IEC Chief Executive Officer also
as IEC's accounting officer). Even in the absence of such a provision, however, the gov-
ernment still would have been under sufficient political pressure to spend whatever neces-
sary to ensure a successful election. See Interview with Judge Dennis Davis, Member,
Kempton Park Technical Committee on Electoral Commission, in Cape Town, S. Afr.
(Nov. 7, 2001) (transcript on file with the New York University Law Review) ("I don't think
finance was a problem. You just had to have the election.., and [the government was]
going to give them the money that they required to run it."); see also Charles Nupen,
Election Authorities: Seminar on Current Trends in Electoral Systems 7 (1994) (on file
with the New York University Law Review) (noting that funding was not issue for IEC
because it developed its own budget). The only constraint on IEC expenditures was sec-
tion 17(2) of the IEC Act, which empowered the Auditor-General to audit IEC records.
See § 17(2).
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Creating such an independent body came with the inherent risk
of abuse of power, and the IEC Act therefore included two measures
designed to constrain IEC action. First, the Special Electoral Court55
was set up to oversee the IEC.5 6 It reviewed all Commission decisions
for integrity and propriety,57 except the determination of the elec-
tion's free and fairness when the Commission's conclusion was final5 8
The IEC Act also imposed a separation of powers within the institu-
tion by dividing tasks between autonomous subcomponents, hoping
such a division would create an internal brake on abuse of power.5 9
The Act established three autonomous offices-Administration,60
Monitoring,61 and Adjudication 6 2 -all of which were accountable to
the LEC.63
B. The IEC and South Africa's Transitional Election
The 1994 South African elections were by most accounts success-
ful, as they achieved their major objective: a peaceful transition to
55 The court was composed of a chairperson, who had to be a judge of the Appellate
Division of the Supreme Court, and two other Supreme Court judges, all of whom were
selected by the Chief Judge, as well as two other members to be selected by the Transi-
tional Council. § 32(2).
56 While those familiar with the American legal system would look to courts to review
independent agency actions for compliance with the law and for rationality in decisionmak-
ing, supra note 15, the judiciary's involvement with apartheid made its use inappropriate.
See Interview with Richard Rosenthal, supra note 34 (relating, in reference to election
process, "what one couldn't do was to trust the issue to the judiciary").
57 See § 33(1)(a) (giving Special Electoral Court final power of review).
58 See § 36(6)(a) ("Any decision of the Commission in terms of [free-and-fair determi-
nation] ... shall be final and not subject to appeal or review."). The Special Electoral
Court also was granted power to hear appeals on legal decisions made by the Commission.
§ 33(2)(a).
59 As Judge Dennis Davis, a member of the technical committee that drafted the IEC
Act, explained, "the question really arose as to how on earth would you.., monitor the
administration .... So what you really wanted to do was to basically try to separate the
functions out so that there would be at least some internal supervision one over the other."
Interview with Judge Dennis Davis, supra note 54.
60 § 19. The Administration Directorate was charged with organizing 9000 voting and
900 counting stations, and to employ personnel to run those stations who would not be
perceived as biased. See Friedman & Stack, supra note 21, at 305 (describing functions of
Administration).
61 § 22. Monitoring had the general responsibility of overseeing the election, which
included investigating party and candidate violations of the Electoral Code of Conduct,
mediating disputes between the political parties, observing the polls on election day, and
gathering and analyzing the information the IEC would use in its ultimate determination of
whether the election was free and fair. Friedman & Stack, supra note 21, at 305-06.
62 § 25. The Adjudication office organized tribunals to hear election disputes.
Friedman & Stack, supra note 21, at 306.
63 Each section describing the powers of the head of the directorates and secretariat
included a statement of that head's independence from the other two heads and subordina-
tion to the Commission as a whole. See §§ 21(3)(b)-(c), 24(i)-(j), 27(c)-(d).
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multiparty democracy with results that were not challenged by any
major player.64 However, such acceptance came in spite of the IEC's
performance, rather than because of it. The institution emerged from
the election as "the butt of dinner table banter and washroom
jokes. ' 65 The reasons for the dismal evaluation of IEC performance
were massive administrative failures during the elections, followed by
messy "vote adjustments" that drew into question the accuracy of the
election results.66
The administrative problems on election day included a large-
scale shortage of items necessary to conduct voting at many polling
stations. 67 The lack of supplies compounded difficulties created by
the IEC's failure to train local election officials adequately. 68 These
officials, many of whom were administering their first election, failed
to keep the records necessary to conduct ballot reconciliation, the pro-
cess by which ballot boxes are matched to polling stations to ensure
the integrity of the vote count.69 As a result, the IEC abandoned the
entire reconciliation process, dramatically impairing the accuracy of
the vote count.70
Breakdowns and political dealings in the counting phase were as
troublesome as the administrative glitches in the voting phase, which
led some analysts to label the results "negotiated."' 7' The IEC failed
to train counting staff adequately in the use of sophisticated computer
64 See, e.g., Nupen, supra note 54, at 15 (concluding that despite shortfalls, election was
success); see also Friedman & Stack, supra note 21, at 323 (noting lack of objection to IEC
proclamation that election was free and fair).
65 Friedman & Stack, supra note 21, at 314.
66 See Interview with Judge Dennis Davis, supra note 54 (identifying major criticisms of
IEC performance).
67 For example, thirty-five percent of districts experienced ballot paper problems, and
twenty-five percent of districts were missing equipment such as ultraviolet lights or invisi-
ble ink necessary to prevent double voting. See Friedman & Stack, supra note 21, at 314,
317 (detailing precinct equipment shortfalls).
68 A survey done by the European Union Election Unit in the last two weeks before
the election found nine percent of all voting stations unprepared. R.W. Johnson, How
Free? How Fair?, in Launching Democracy in South Africa 323, 332 (R.W. Johnson &
Lawrence Schlemmer eds., 1996). Five percent of all stations had no officials to train pol-
ling officers, fourteen percent lacked trained voting officers, and six percent lacked ap-
pointed monitors. Id. at 332-33.
69 See Friedman & Stack, supra note 21, at 320. Shortage of ballot papers also led to
the printing of nine million extra ballots during the election in such a manner that reconcil-
iation would not be possible. See id.
70 See id. (observing that ballot reconciliation is "standard protection against fraud,"
and recounting how Electoral Commission (EC) Chairman Johann Kriegler instructed vot-
ing stations not to reconcile ballots).
71 See id. at 319, 324 (using words "negotiated election" in title of article's section on
"the vote count and result"); Johnson, supra note 68, at 330-32 (explaining "plethora of
rumours of a 'deal"' over vote results and speculating that "the election result was to some
extent the 'negotiated' result of popular report").
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equipment, crippling the Results Control Centre (RCC), which was
responsible for tabulating results.72 These difficulties, coupled with
evidence of a hacker's entry into the computer systems, resulted in the
closing of the RCC days after the counting had begun, but before it
had been finished. 73
As the IEC closed down computer tabulation, the NP came for-
ward with evidence of widespread fraud and threatened to bring suit
challenging the validity of the election. 74 Then, inexplicably, no new
vote totals were given over the next two days.75 This was followed by
the announcement of election results that made all parties happy: the
ANC had won just under the two-thirds of seats in the National As-
sembly (NA) needed to unilaterally write the constitution; the NP had
claimed just over the twenty percent needed to enter the Government
of National Unity, and the Inkatha Freedom Party, a Zulu-dominated
regional party, did sufficiently well in Zulu areas to claim power in the
province of KwaZulu-Natal. 76
These results alone would have raised questions of a negotiated
election result. The IEC's slipshod handling of its post-election duties
only heightened these suspicions.77 For example, the IEC gave the
Analysis Department of the Monitoring Directorate just a few hours
to prepare the report that was to form the basis of the Commission's
free-and-fair determination.78 It then certified the election as free and
fair immediately upon hearing the report, having spent little time on
deliberation.79 Moreover, in making its legislatively mandated post-
election report, the IEC engaged in self-serving minimalizations of se-
rious election shortcomings.80 While the IEC was correct in noting
72 See Friedman & Stack, supra note 21, at 321 (connecting "puzzled queries" by com-
puters to failure to train Results Control Centre (RCC) staff on difference between batch
tallies and final counts).
73 See id. at 321. After the RCC was closed, auditors and part of the Monitoring Direc-
torate finalized the vote tally with simpler technology than that employed by the RCC. Id.
74 See Johnson, supra note 68, at 330 (describing NP affidavits indicating voting irregu-
larities such as individuals voting repeatedly).
75 See id. at 331.
76 See Interview with Judge Dennis Davis, supra note 54 (noting that election results
that emerged were "remarkably wonderful for everybody").
77 Suspicions also were raised by the fact that all parties dropped their challenges to the
election results. See Friedman & Stack, supra note 21, at 325.
78 See id. at 324. The decision to ask for the report came only after widespread criti-
cism of IEC's plan to approve the election without a report. See id.
79 See id. This decision may have reflected the political situation, as the IEC could not
have thrown out an election when none of the major parties wanted a new election and
where the people accepted the results as roughly accurate. See id. at 325.
80 For example, the IEC recognized the prevalence of "no-go" zones, or areas where
one political party prevented other parties' access. See Indep. Electoral Comm'n, supra
note 23, at 53 (stating, in IEC Report, that significant parts of country were no-go zones).
However, the post-election IEC Report claimed they had no "significant effect on the out-
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
October 2002] 1169
HeinOnline  -- 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1169 2002
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
that many of the election's problems were largely outside its control,8 '
it came under criticism for not acknowledging the depth of those
problems in an effort to make the election appear more fair than it
really was.82
C. Moving Forward: Lessons from the 1994 Elections
Legislators drew two major lessons from the experiences of the
transitional IEC that informed their formulation of a permanent elec-
toral body.83 The first concerned separation of powers: the same
body charged with administering the election cannot be expected to
render a credible judgment as to whether that election was free and
fair.84 Such a concentration of powers violated the principle that one
should not be a judge in his own case and, in so doing, created an
internal conflict of interest that undermined the credibility of the
IEC's post-election analysis.85
To address this problem, the IEC concluded that it was better to
limit the scope of a future commission to election administration.8 6 A
streamlined commission would allow the body to develop into a small,
come of the elections," id. at 54, because parties that could not campaign in those areas
had little chance of winning votes there. See id. (arguing that political parties "acted wisely
in not wasting their efforts on lost causes").
81 See id. (noting that IEC's strategy to counteract effect of no-go zones "could not
reverse a national trend in a few weeks"). The breadth of the problem makes such a claim
plausible. See Tom Lodge, Intimidation and Restriction on Voter Choice-Lessons from
the 1994 Elections, in South African Election Update: November 1998-June 1999, supra
note 2, at 16, 16 (tallying at least 165 no-go zones characterized by pressure ranging from
"vigorous persuasion" to outright intimidation).
82 For example, R.W. Johnson criticized the IEC's claim that voters in no-go zones
were unlikely to be undecided as "uncomfortably reminiscent of the type of [racial] reason-
ing which became all too familiar to South Africans in the apartheid era," in that it pre-
sumed people's preferences on the basis of race. Johnson, supra note 68, at 329.
83 These lessons remain important in considering current proposals to reform the EC.
See discussion infra Part III.
84 See Friedman & Stack, supra note 21, at 302 ("[A] touch of the absurd [exists] in
asking the IEC to monitor and judge itself.").
85 The self-serving minimalizations that characterized IEC's post-election analysis can
best be understood as the product of this conflict of interest. Popular confidence in the
election process depended upon IEC claims that it was prepared to conduct the election,
which it made with advertisements stating: "We are ready; are you?" Such pronounce-
ments of readiness fed skepticism about the willingness of the IEC to be subsequently
critical of its performance, skepticism that was reinforced by post-election misrepresenta-
tions. See Johnson, supra note 68, at 326 (claiming IEC was responsible for much cynicism
surrounding its election certification).
86 The IEC claimed that a future electoral commission would not need to perform a
monitoring function because civil society and the political parties would be able to assume
responsibility for monitoring the election. Indep. Electoral Comm'n, supra note 23, at 86.
Political parties already had played an important monitoring role in the 1994 elections
through the presence of party agents in the voting and counting phases. See David Pottie,
The Role of Political Parties in Election Monitoring and Observation, in South African
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permanent unit of election experts, engaged in "research, planning,
legal drafting, standardisation and training," with an additional poli-
cymaking component capable of advising Parliament. 7 This body still
would determine the final election results, but it no longer would have
to certify that the election was free and fair."" The preference not to
involve a future electoral commission in a free-and-fair determination
reflected the difficulty any institution would face in declaring an elec-
tion free and fair in the absence of a justiciable standard by which to
make that assessment.8 9 Instead, a judgment that an election was in
fact free and fair would emerge from courts resolving electoral peti-
tions on a case-by-case basis.90
A second lesson legislators drew from the EEC's troubles was that
administrative inefficiencies could themselves corrode institutional in-
dependence. The ability of political parties to negotiate a result
through backroom dealings was due at least in part to the IEC's lack
of confidence in its results;91 given that any final vote tally was subject
to a plausible fraud challenge, generating a result that all parties
would support was necessary to prevent the election from being over-
Election Update: November 1998-June 1999, supra note 2, at 87, 87 (describing party
agents as critical to legitimacy of 1994 election results).
87 See Indep. Electoral Comm'n, supra note 23, at 87 (suggesting that electoral agency
composed of experts would enhance credibility of electoral process in cost-effective
manner).
8s See id. at 86 ("In future, however, there should be no necessity for any certification
over and above the formal declaration of an election result."); see also Commonwealth
Secretariat, The Legal and Administrative Framework for Future Elections in South Af-
rica: Report on Consultations with the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) and with
the South African Government 4 (1994) (citing separation of responsibility for administra-
tion and responsibility for oversight of elections as issue for South Africa to address). A
racially integrated judiciary could replace the adjudication secretariat in resolving election
disputes, albeit with either expedited procedural rules or a special electoral court to hear
time-sensitive election claims. See Commonwealth Secretariat, supra, at 6 (noting that or-
dinary courts may be able to handle electoral disputes in future); Indep. Electoral
Comm'n, supra note 23, at 86.
89 See Thuetsad & Selch, supra note 2, at 15 (finding no clear South African jurispru-
dence or agreed upon international definition on which to base interpretation of "free and
fair"). Note, however, that Thuetsad and Selch also argue that South African laws prohib-
iting certain election practices, coupled with international norms, could guide an interpre-
tation of "free and fair." Id.
90 See id. at 15-16 (stating that, where IEC had had to "certify" election as "substan-
tially free and fair," new EC would only have to "ensure and promote conditions condu-
cive to a free and fair election," leaving "determination of issues of freeness and fairness to
the Electoral Court, if any of the election stakeholders should want to question the result,
or any other aspect, of the election" (bold omitted)).
91 See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text (describing administrative errors that
undermined accuracy of results).
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turned.92 Accordingly, protecting any future commission from politi-
cal interference required designing an effective election-management
plan that would minimize inefficiencies. 93
Creating such a model required at least two changes. First, the
poor performance of local officials in both the voting and counting
phases demonstrated the need to develop a reservoir of election talent
in local communities. 94 Doing so required a clearly defined role for
provincial and municipal government officials in election administra-
tion, something which was absent in the IEC's founding legislation.95
The Commonwealth Secretariat, which observed the 1994 election,
suggested incorporating such officials using the principle of sub-
sidiarity which devolves decisionmaking authority to the most local
92 It is not coincidental that the mysterious "vote adjustments" took place immediately
after the NP announced its intention to challenge the election results. See supra notes 74-
79 and accompanying text.
93 Neither the IEC Act nor Electoral Act 202 of 1993 specified how the IEC was to
administer the elections. The IEC itself developed an election-management plan with the
help of the nonvoting international members. See Indep. Electoral Comm'n, supra note
23, at 27 (explaining that election-readiness plan was prepared with help of Canadian ex-
pert). However, key elements of that plan were implemented far too late to be effective.
For example, provincial IEC offices, which were to monitor the performance of local elec-
tion officials, were not created until March, id. at 28, too close to the April election to be
effective.
The failure of the IEC to institute its election-management plan cannot be attributed
solely to the body. The transition negotiators allocated an insufficient amount of time for
election preparation. See Friedman & Stack, supra note 21, at 304-05 (observing that IEC
had just four months to construct institution of 300,000 employees). Additionally, the fact
that many South Africans lacked any identification made preparation of a voters' roll,
necessary to check fraud, impossible. See Johnson, supra note 68, at 348 (concluding that
voters' roll would have eliminated many errors); see also Interview with Judge Dennis
Davis, supra note 54 (calling difficulties surrounding compiling voters' roll "insurmounta-
ble"). Such impediments are unlikely to occur again. The IEC strongly argued that an
election should never again be organized in such a short time period. Indep. Electoral
Comm'n, supra note 23, at 84. Meanwhile the constitution mandated a voters' roll for
future elections. S. Afr. Const. (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200,
1993) sched. 4, art. VIII.
94 Election administration in a country with the size and population of South Africa
necessitates using subnational units in the administration of an election. See Murphy,
supra note 7, at 34 (arguing for establishment of regional election authorities). For exam-
ple, Paraguay, which has a population one-eighth the size of South Africa's (5.7 million, as
compared to South Africa's 43.7 million, The World Almanac and Book of Facts 838, 849
(2002)), uses subnational units to administer national elections. See, e.g., id. (detailing use
of electoral boards subordinate to national Junta Electoral Central). Countries without an
independent electoral commission also use subnational units to administer national elec-
tions. See Samuel Issacharoff et al., When Elections Go Bad 23-25 (2001) (describing
states as primary locus of election activity in United States, even for national offices).
95 Richard Rosenthal opines that the Kempton Park Technical Committee did not con-
sider "in any material way" the relationship between the IEC and local governments in
administering the election. Interview with Richard Rosenthal, supra note 34.
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body practicable. 96 A future commission could use local government
officials as polling officers, thus cultivating election experience within
local government.97
Second, any subsequent commission needed to tackle more di-
rectly the problem of finding racially diverse personnel to administer
the election. 98 Many of the administrative breakdowns during the
transitional election can be understood as a function of racial integra-
tion without adequate training.99 Such breakdowns could be viewed
as forgivable "growing pains" of racial integration, but only if a mech-
anism for adequately training such officials for future elections is im-
plemented. Using civil servants from the apartheid regime who ran
the racially restricted pre-1994 elections to train those with no election
experience might better harness existing skills.100
Thus, the experience of the IEC in 1994 argued for a future com-
mission with streamlined responsibilities and an election-management
plan capable of delivering an efficient election. Part II considers how
these suggestions were incorporated into the design of the permanent
Electoral Commission.
96 See Commonwealth Secretariat, supra note 88, at 10 (arguing for subsidiarity in all
areas of future electoral body, including finances).
97 See Indep. Electoral Comm'n, supra note 23, at 87 (asserting importance of using
local government officials in election administration to create "reservoirs of skills through-
out the country").
98 See Murphy, supra note 7, at 33 (pointing out lack of election experience for most
nonwhite election officials); Interview with Judge Dennis Davis, supra note 54 ("The sad
reality of apartheid was that black people in this country had never gone through an elec-
tion before .... So the problem that one had was where was one going to get the personnel
for [an election] ....").
99 See supra note 68 (discussing widespread failure to train local election personnel).
At times, the IEC also sacrificed integration to avoid potentially embarrassing failures.
For example, there was a grave shortage of experienced nonwhite adjudicators for appoint-
ment to dispute-resolution tribunals. See Robertson, supra note 31, at 55 ("'If all electoral
tribunals were to be staffed by people with LLBs [i.e., people with a Bachelor of Laws
degree] and 20 years' experience, (they) would be, what else, white and male. That is not
tenable .... "' (quoting Dene Smuts, Democratic Party MP)). Rather than providing train-
ing for new adjudicators, or just acknowledging the depth of this problem, the Parliament
quietly amended the Independent Electoral Commission Act to allow more serious dis-
putes to be referred to an appeals panel chaired by an actual judge. See id. (discussing
"hasty" amendment to IEC Act).
100 See Interview with Richard Rosenthal, supra note 34 ("[T]he commission found that
it desperately needed the knowledge of those specific people who had run elections before.
They knew how to do it."). DHA officials with election expertise were distrusted because
of their perceived NP bias. Interview with Judge Dennis Davis, supra note 54.
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II
THE CONSTITUTIONAL ELECrORAL COMMISSION
The IEC Act governed only the transitional election, meaning
there was no electoral commission in place after transition.' 0' How-
ever, as Part I showed, the performance of the IEC, while far from
perfect, provided a reference point from which those creating a per-
manent electoral commission could work. This Part turns to the con-
stitutional Electoral Commission and examines how it was influenced
by the IEC. Part II.A discusses the reasons why South Africa's consti-
tutional drafters opted for an electoral commission and describes the
legal framework for that commission. Part II.B then examines the dif-
ficulties that ambiguous constitutional and statutory text posed to the
government and the EC in defining the contours of their relationship,
and the Constitutional Court's attempt to resolve this dispute. Finally,
Part II.C analyzes the EC's performance in the 1999 elections, identi-
fying weak points that need to be fixed in future elections.
A. Creating a Permanent Electoral Commission
1. Developing a Formula
Postapartheid South Africa's decision to create a permanent elec-
toral commission had at least five strong theoretical bases. First, the
experience of other transitional democracies suggested the impor-
tance of an electoral commission to the legitimacy of election results
in a nation without a strong democratic tradition. 10 2 Second, the
ANC's electoral dominance 0 3 created concern among opposition par-
ties, including the NP, about use of that power for process-lockup pur-
poses, leading these parties to support an electoral commission as a
"democracy branch" of government.104 Third, even as the ANC inte-
101 See § 2 of Independent Electoral Commission Act 150 of 1993 (limiting applicability
of Act to first elections). The Act covered only the transitional election to allow a demo-
cratically elected body to make the final determination on whether to use an electoral
commission. See Murphy et al., supra note 42, at 244; see also Interview with Judge Dennis
Davis, supra note 54 (stating that Kempton Park Technical Committee felt permanent elec-
toral commission needed to go "through a normal Parliamentary process, where the major-
ity could put up its hand and sa[y], 'This is what we are going to do').
102 See Commonwealth Secretariat, supra note 88, at 5 (noting international trend to-
ward usiig electoral commissions and suggesting their appropriateness where there is no
democratic tradition); see also supra note 8 (listing transitional democracies that have em-
ployed electoral commissions).
103 The ANC controlled 252 out of 400 seats in the National Assembly (NA). Stephen
Rule, Outcome of the Election, in Democracy South Africa: Evaluating the 1999 Election
107, 110 (Yvonne Muthien ed., 1999).
104 See Interview with Sheila Camerer, New National Party, Member of Parliament, in
Cape Town, S. Afr. (Oct. 18, 2001) (transcript on file with the New York University Law
Review) (describing NP view that electoral commission would serve as "bastion[ ] for
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grated the DHA and judiciary, those who ran the apartheid state con-
tinued to play an important role in the postapartheid government, 10 5
giving even the ANC good reason to distrust government-adminis-
tered elections. Fourth, given the administrative chaos that had sur-
rounded the 1994 election, it was clear that the country needed to
improve its election-management skills, and it was felt that a cadre of
experts might help achieve this goal.10 6 Finally, the time-sensitive na-
ture of election disputes necessitated a body capable of adjudicating
election disputes expeditiously. 0 7
All the major political parties embraced the idea of an electoral
commission based on a roughly similar formula: 08 The commission
maintenance of... minority rights"); see also supra note 39 (discussing role of electoral
commissions as "democracy branch"). While the NP and other parties that were out of
power now needed an electoral commission in the way the ANC did at transition, they held
far less power in a democratically elected body than the out-of-power parties had held in
the transitional discussions. See Interview with Richard Rosenthal, supra note 34 (describ-
ing "disproportionate" influence of small parties at transition).
105 See Interview with Richard Rosenthal, supra note 34 (explaining that postapartheid
South Africa needs to use apartheid officials because of shortage of qualified, untainted
officials).
106 An electoral commission could use its knowledge to run professional elections
through utilizing provincial and local governments, civil society, and the political parties.
See Indep. Electoral Comm'n, supra note 23, at 87 (positing permanent electoral agency as
source of expertise for local authorities for their elections); Murphy, supra note 7, at 26
(suggesting that "peculiar exigencies of elections" require specialized agency of experts);
see also supra notes 94-97.
107 See, e.g., Commonwealth Secretariat, supra note 88, at 6 (seeing need for competent
institution to handle time-sensitive electoral petitions). While speed might be affected by
expedited procedural rules in ordinary courts, having an adjudicative body experienced in
election law cases would advance that body's learning curve and improve the quality of
election jurisprudence. See Note, Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts in Private
Civil Actions, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 509, 512 (1957) (maintaining that limiting number of courts
handling type of dispute will increase experience and thus competence of hearing court).
10s The ANC, NP, Democratic Party, and African Christian Democratic Party all made
electoral-commission proposals roughly on the model ultimately adopted, although some
included powers ultimately not granted to the EC. See South African Constitutional As-
sembly, Theme Committee 6.1: Electoral Commission 1 (no date) (draft ANC submission)
(on file with Constitutional Assembly and the New York University Law Review) (advocat-
ing that electoral commission administer and supervise elections); South African Constitu-
tional Assembly, Theme Committee 6.1, at 1-2 (no date) (submission of African Christian
Democratic Party) (on file with Constitutional Assembly and the New York University Law
Review) (promoting independent electoral commission that works closely with local gov-
ernment); South African Constitutional Assembly, Theme Committee Six, Subtheme Com-
mittee 6.1: Election Commission 2-4 (Nat'l Party preliminary submission) (1995) (on file
with Constitutional Assembly and the New York University Law Review) (arguing for elec-
toral commission directly accountable to Parliament whose job it is to "control and moni-
tor the election process"); South African Constitutional Assembly, Subtheme Committee
6.1: Independent Electoral Commission, 1-2 (1995) (Democratic Party submission) (on file
with Constitutional Assembly and the New York University Law Review) (supporting IEC
with powers of "interpreting the electoral law and adopting regulations; designating and
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would be a constitutionally enshrined10 9 independent body responsi-
ble for elections at all levels of government.110 For the NP and other
minority parties, a constitutionally enshrined electoral commission
provided a better guarantee of fair elections than a legislatively cre-
ated commission, which could be scrapped at any time."1 The ANC
supported the commission based on its historical commitment to insti-
tutions essential to a democratic state.1 2
2. EC Developed: Constitutional and Legal Framework
The 1996 constitution creates the EC as a Chapter 9 "State Insti-
tution[ ] Supporting Constitutional Democracy."'1 13 While providing a
bare legal underpinning for the EC, the constitution leaves most of
the details to subsequent enabling legislation. 114
training of provincial election officials; certification of candidates and registered parties
... ; investigating and adjudicating complaints").
109 Under the transitional arrangements, the newly elected legislature acted as a consti-
tutional assembly to draft a final constitution for postapartheid South Africa. See S. Afr.
Const. (Constitution Act 200, 1993) § 68(1)-(2) (designating National Assembly and Sen-
ate, sitting jointly, as constitutional assembly). While this assembly was bound by some
written "constitutional principles" negotiated in transition, id. sched. 4, an electoral com-
mission was not included in those principles. See id. sched. 4., art. VIII (calling for "repre-
sentative government embracing multi-party democracy, regular elections, universal adult
suffrage, a common voters' roll, and, in general, proportional representation," but making
no mention of electoral commission).
110 See Commonwealth Secretariat, supra note 88, at 9 (observing "general acceptance"
of above formula for final electoral commission).
111 See Interview with Sheila Camerer, supra note 104 ("[I]t is better to have [the EC] as
one of the... organization[s] supporting democracy than to have an ad hoc arrangement
that's in the gift of the President or the hands of the people who put legislation before the
Assembly.").
112 See South African Constitutional Assembly, Theme Committee 6.1: Electoral Com-
mission 1 (no date) (draft ANC submission) (on file with Constitutional Assembly and the
New York University Law Review) (explaining that support for commission "emanate[d]
from the values and principles underpinning democratic constitutionalism"). However, the
ANC also might have been motivated by recognition that a credible electoral commission
would bestow legitimacy upon elections, which their popularity dictated they would win.
See infra text accompanying note 212.
113 S. Afr. Const. (Constitution Act, 1996) ch. 9, § 181(1)(f). The other Chapter 9 insti-
tutions are: the Public Protector; the Human Rights Commission; the Commission for the
Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious, and Linguistic Communi-
ties; the Commission for Gender Equality; and the Auditor-General. § 181(1)(a)-(e).
While the drafters initially favored treating each of these institutions separately, they de-
cided to treat the six bodies together to shorten an already long document. See Interview
with Sheila Camerer, supra note 104 (describing blanket clauses on Chapter 9 institutions'
independence as method of shortening constitution). One consequence of using the chap-
ter structure was a change in the name of the institution from IEC to EC, with "indepen-
dent" left in the covering clauses. See id. (noting it would have been tautology to have
"independent" repeated in institutional name).
114 See S. Afr. Const. (Constitution Act, 1996) ch. 9 § 190(2) ("The Electoral Commis-
sion has the additional powers and functions prescribed by national legislation.").
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The constitution does specify three important features of the EC.
First, section 190 of the constitution, which defines the functions of the
EC, gives the body an executive, rather than judicial, role.115 Unlike
the IEC, which was charged with determining whether the election
was free and fair, the EC's task is defined as "ensur[ing]" and "pro-
moting" a free and fair election, 116 meaning that its focus is on the
implementation of national election legislation.117 Second, the consti-
tution establishes the EC as an independent institution," 8 which is
also accountable to the National Assembly. 1 9 The constitution does
not explain what it means for an independent institution to be ac-
countable to the legislature. 20 Third, sections 193 to 194 of the con-
stitution give the majority party the power to appoint' 2' and
remove 22 commissioners 23
115 See § 190 (listing functions as managing elections, ensuring they are free and fair,
and declaring results). Section 190 also allows national legislation to prescribe "additional
powers and functions." § 190(2). By limiting the EC to an administrative role, the consti-
tution avoids the problem of overbroad powers that plagued the IEC. See supra note 86
and accompanying text (mentioning ]EC recommendation that future commission be lim-
ited to administration).
116 § 190(1)(b).
117 Thuetsad & Selch, supra note 2, at 14. See text accompanying note 90.
118 § 181(2) ("These institutions are independent, and subject only to the Constitution
and the law."). The guarantee of independence is supplemented by a mandate that other
organs of the state assist and protect the independence of the Chapter 9 institutions and by
a prohibition on interference with the institutions' work. § 181(3)-(4). Much of the lan-
guage of section 181 is identical to that of section 165, which establishes the independence
of the judiciary, with the exception of the provision making the commissions accountable
to the National Assembly. See §§ 165, 181(5) (stating commissions are accountable to
NA).
119 § 181(5). Accountability to the legislature was not an issue for the IEC because
there was no freely elected legislature that could hold it accountable.
120 Not surprisingly, defining these terms becomes the source of much tension between
the government and EC. See discussion infra Part II.B.
121 S. Afr. Const. (Constitution Act, 1996) ch. 9, § 193(5)(b)(ii). A committee within the
Assembly, composed proportionately of members from the parties represented within the
NA, nominates candidates to the NA with civil-society input allowed on recommendations.
§ 193(5)(a), (6).
122 § 194(2)(b). Removal of commissioners is allowed only with a finding of misconduct,
incapacity, or incompetence by a proportionately representative NA committee,
§ 194(1)(a)-(b), followed by an NA resolution calling for removal supported by a majority
of MPs. § 194(1)(c). Note that the National Assembly committee can only make a finding
that the commissioner should be removed upon a recommendation from the Electoral
Court. § 7(3)(a)(ii) of Electoral Commission Act 51 of 1996.
123 Such an appointment and removal system opens the EC to accusations that commis-
sioners are in fact party-political appointees. See infra notes 179-80 and accompanying
text. By contrast, in practice, the commissioners on the IEC were selected based on the
consensus of all the political parties involved in the transitional negotiations. See supra
note 49 and accompanying text.
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The 1996 Electoral Commission Act 124 (EC Act) fleshes out the
details of EC functions and structure, using the outline given in the
constitution. The Act confirms that the EC is primarily an executive
body,125 assigning it more administrative functions than those of the
IEC,126 and leaving tasks such as election monitoring outside the
scope of EC duties.'2 7
The EC Act also attempts to give meaning to the constitutional
guarantee of independence by creating several safeguards to protect
the EC from political encroachment. The ANC attempted to use the
EC Act to counter perceptions created by the constitutional appoint-
ment process that commissioners would be party-political appoin-
tees.128 To that end, the Act creates a panel composed of independent
actors to nominate a list of potential commissioners for consideration
by the National Assembly.129 It also replicates many of the limitations
on commissioner behavior found in the 1993 IEC Act.130
124 Electoral Commission Act 51 of 1996.
125 Unlike the IEC, see supra note 52, the EC did not have direct command over the
police and military to enforce its orders, relying instead on government cooperation. To
that end, the South African Police Services, South African National Defense Force, and the
National Intelligence Agency were brought together under the guidance of a Cabinet Task
Group to work closely with the EC. See Electoral Comm'n of the Republic of S. Afr.,
Report: National and Provincial Elections, 2 June 1999, at 63 (1999).
126 The most important of these administrative tasks, outside of those already specified
in the constitution, are compiling a common national voters' roll and list of registered
parties, developing and promoting knowledge of electoral expertise and technology, con-
tinuously reviewing electoral legislation and making recommendations therewith, and pro-
moting voter education. See § 5 of Electoral Commission Act 51 of 1996. As an
administrative agency, the EC has the power to cast regulations, § 23(1), although unlike
under the 1993 Act scheme, such regulations do not supercede conflicting parliamentary
legislation.
127 Election monitoring was to be left largely to the political parties and civil society.
See Indep. Electoral Comm'n, supra note 23, at 86 (recommending civil society and politi-
cal parties monitor future elections). The EC was responsible for accrediting nonparty
election observers based on criteria detailed in the Electoral Act of 1998. See § 84 of
Electoral Act 73 of 1998 (specifying accreditation procedure). Party agents, or party repre-
sentatives accredited to observe the election, also were regulated by the Electoral Act. See
§§ 58 to 59 (listing requirements for party agents).
128 See infra notes 179-80 and accompanying text.
129 See § 6(3)-(4) of Electoral Commission Act 51 of 1996 (placing on panel President of
Constitutional Court, representative of Human Rights Commission, representative of
Commission on Gender Equality, and Public Protector). The panel was mandated to act
with "transparency and openness" in its candidate selection. § 6(5). The panel's nominees
could not include anyone with "a high party-political profile" because such people were
barred from serving on the commission. § 6(2)(b).
130 See supra note 50 and accompanying text. These restrictions include prohibitions on
holding political office during one's term on the EC, a post-EC eighteen-month disqualifi-
cation from serving as a member of Parliament, provincial legislature, or local government,
and requirements that commissioners disclose conflicts of interest. §§ 9(2)(a), 9(2)(f), 10.
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As an additional safeguard the EC Act grants the Commission
fiscal independence. 131 The Act makes the EC-appointed chief elec-
toral officer (CEO) the institution's "accounting officer."'1 32 As an ac-
counting officer, the CEO is responsible for accounting for all moneys
received and spent by the EC, a role normally fulfilled by a govern-
ment minister.1 33 The Act also specifies that EC financial records will
be audited directly by the Auditor-General, a constitutionally
independent officer, 34 as opposed to being reviewed by a government
minister. 35
The EC Act, like the IEC Act before it, generally left to the
Commission the task of formulating a management plan that would
improve the efficiency of election administration. 36 The Act did give
the Commission the power to utilize public administration at any level
of government to conduct elections. 137 This grant of power, along
with the experience of 1994, encouraged the EC to choose a manage-
ment model based on the principle of subsidiarity.138
131 While the 1993 IEC Act did the same, fiscal independence was not a major concern
during the transition. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
132 § 12(2)(b) of Electoral Commission Act 51 of 1996.
133 See 99 38 to 40 of Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999 (describing responsibili-
ties of "accounting officers"). By shifting this power to an official within the EC, the 1996
Electoral Commission Act (EC Act) assures that no government minister is financially
responsible for the EC.
134 S. Afr. Const. (Constitution Act, 1996) ch. 9, § 181(1)(e) (establishing Auditor-Gen-
eral as independent Chapter 9 institution).
135 § 13(3) of Electoral Commission Act 51 of 1996. These audited records are to be
presented annually to the NA. § 14(1).
136 See supra note 93 (discussing failure of IEC Act to specify management plan).
137 See § 5(p). The EC used its ability to enlist local government to appoint town clerks
as local election officers (LEOs) responsible for the election in their district. Electoral
omm'n of the Republic of S. Afr., supra note 137, at 12-13, 25. Supervision of the LEOs
was entrusted to the provincial offices. See id. at 25 (describing duties of provincial EC
offices). Giving municipal officers responsibility for running elections in their towns gave
the EC access to municipal resources, id., but at the cost of using potentially partisan elec-
tion officers. See infra notes 181-83 and accompanying text (describing partisan behavior
of LEOs).
13s See supra note 96 and accompanying text (defining subsidiarity). The head office
was to be involved in policymaking and strategic management, with 441 municipal offices
conducting the actual voter registration and election activities under the supervision of
nine provincial head offices. See Electoral Comm'n of the Republic of S. Afr., supra note
137, at 12 (describing management model). Party Liaison Committees also were set up on
national, provincial, and local levels. See id. at 50 (noting that such committees existed in
"all three spheres of government"). However, the limited capacity of local government left
information technology, procurement, logistics, and financial administration under central-
ized control. Id. at 12.
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B. Independent and Accountable?
The EC Act fleshed out the constitution's mandate that the EC
would be an independent body, but it remained largely silent on what
the constitution meant when it said that the EC also would be ac-
countable to the National Assembly.139 An institution both indepen-
dent from the executive and accountable to the NA had no precedent
in South Africa 140 and was antithetical to a system in which the execu-
tive dominates the legislature. 141 This Part traces the tension between
the government and the EC over the appropriate role of the executive
and the legislature in overseeing independent institutions. These diffi-
culties ended in a suit by the NP's new incarnation, the New National
Party (NNP), requesting court relief over alleged executive encroach-
ments into EC independence. This Part also details the Constitutional
Court's attempt to resolve the boundaries between legitimate govern-
ment action and unconstitutional interference.
1. Turf Fight: The EC, the Executive, and Money
From the appointment of the electoral commission on July 9,
1997, the EC and the government battled over the appropriate degree
of fiscal autonomy owed to an independent institution.142 The DHA
139 The only provision designed to ensure EC accountability to the National Assembly
was section 14(1), which mandated the EC give the National Assembly audited financial
statements once per year. § 14(1). The Act did, as in 1994, create an Electoral Court
empowered to review all Commission decisions and to hear appeals from EC decisions
insofar as those decisions require legal interpretation. § 20. The Electoral Court is com-
posed of five members, three of whom (including the chair) are judges. The other two,
who have no specified qualifications other than South African citizenship, are appointed
by the President on the recommendation of the independent Judicial Service Commission.
§ 19(1). The Electoral Court sits alongside national courts and has power to determine the
procedural rules to be used by the ordinary courts in hearing electoral petitions.
§ 20(4)(a). It also can determine which courts shall have jurisdiction to hear such disputes.
§ 20(4)(b). It was believed that the expedited procedural rules of the Electoral Court
would lead litigants with time-sensitive electoral petitions to use it. See § 20(2)(c) (specify-
ing that appeals shall be heard, considered, and decided within three days of granting
appeal).
140 See Aff. of Johann Christiaan Kriegler 31, New Nat'l Party v. Gov't of the
Republic of S. Afr., 1999 (5) BCLR 489 (CC) ("There is, after all, no South African prece-
dent for an agency that is dependent upon the fiscus for funding, accountable to Parliament
for its activities but independently responsible under the Constitution and the law, for the
management of the very selection of government.").
141 In South Africa's parliamentary system, the NA elects the President. S. AfT. Const.
(Constitution Act, 1996) ch. 5, § 86(1). However, NA members are prohibited from floor-
crossing, or voting against the positions of their party leadership; if they do so, except in a
no-confidence vote, they lose their seats. This means that, once selected, the executive can
pass whatever legislation it wishes, so long as it maintains the confidence of the legislature.
The result is a very strong executive and weak legislature.
142 See Aff. of Johann Christiaan Kriegler T 36, New Nat'l Party (noting DHA's attempt
to exercise control over EC beginning July 1997).
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and the Department of State Expenditure (DSE), which is responsible
for accounting for expenditure of funds for the government, believed
that the DHA was politically accountable for the EC.143 Political ac-
countability, the government argued, meant that all EC expenditures
needed to be accounted for by the DHA, making the EC a subdepart-
ment of the DHA for fiscal purposes.144 Because it held this view, the
DSE refused to deal directly with the EC on budget matters, 145 result-
ing in the DHA and DSE making budgetary decisions without EC
leadership present. Further, the DHA denied the EC the opportunity
to defend, to the National Assembly, its budget requests for the 1997-
1998 fiscal year.146 As a result, the EC never received a financial allo-
cation for that year. 47 Moreover, the DHA and DSE claimed the EC
was subject to treasury regulations that allowed the DHA to impose
conditions on the EC before disbursing funds.148
EC Chairman Johann Kriegler opposed the government's view
that the DHA was financially accountable for the EC on both legal
and policy grounds. As a legal matter, section 12(2)(b) of the Electo-
ral Commission Act made the EC's CEO the EC's accounting of-
143 New Nat'l Party, 1999 (5) BCLR at 519 (quoting DHA Director General Albert
Mokoena in his letter to Chairperson of Electoral Commission, opining that "'[w]hen the
Electoral Commission Act, 1996, was passed through... Parliament, the Minister of Home
Affairs was in no way relinquished of his responsibility to be politically accountable for the
new Commission .... ').
144 See id. (quoting DHA Director General Mokoena claiming EC was DHA line item).
145 See Aff. of Johann Christiaan Kriegler 39, New Nat'l Party (noting Department of
State Expenditure (DSE)'s refusal to deal with EC directly).
146 See id. I 36, 40, 60 (detailing agreement between DHA and DSE, made without
EC leaders present, denying EC opportunity to defend budget requests to National
Assembly).
147 Id. 53-60. The EC subsisted on less than 40 million Rand (R40 million) left over
from the 1994 IEC. Id. 60.
148 See New Nat'l Party, 1999 (5) BCLR at 521 (commenting that Minister of Finance, in
affidavit, expressed bewilderment at EC's view that it was not bound by treasury instruc-
tions). Clearly uncertain about the legality of their position, the government introduced
the Independent Electoral Commission Amendment Act in October 1997, which proposed
to make the Minister of Home Affairs politically accountable for the EC and the Director
General of Home Affairs the accounting officer. See Aff. of Johann Christiaan Kriegler I
44, New Nat'l Party (describing introduction of bill "aimed at curtailing" EC's "financial,
administrative and political independence"). After top EC leaders came out publicly
against the legislation, the bill was withdrawn. See id. 45 (claiming amendment was
shelved after "implacable" EC opposition); see also Marion Edmunds, Who's in Charge of
the Next Elections?, at http:/wwv.mg.co.za/mg/news/98jan2/30jan-elections.html (Jan. 30,
1998) (no longer accessible online) (on file with the New York University School of Law)
("'If somebody other than the chief electoral officer is the accounting officer[ ], how can
the IEC have that necessary independence?"') (quoting EC Chief Electoral Officer
(CEO), Mandla Mchunu).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
October 2002]
HeinOnline  -- 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1181 2002
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
ficer, 149 and hence, legally responsible to the Parliament for the EC's
expenditure of government funds. 150 As a policy matter, giving DHA
the ability to place conditions on EC receipt of money gave it unac-
ceptable control over the independent entity.' 51
In addition to battling the government over financial reporting
protocol, Kriegler fought against what he believed were unfair budg-
etary allocations for the EC.152 After an initial agreement between
the EC (acting through the DHA) and the DSE on a budget of 965
million Rand (R965 million) ($196 million) for 1998-1999,153 the ac-
tual allocation for 1998-1999 was R600 million ($122 million), 54 R365
million ($74 million) less than promised. The government then ap-
plied pressure on the EC to reformulate its election-administration
plan to reflect lower levels of funding. 155 The EC responded by re-
vamping the voter-registration process, using government civil ser-
vants and military personnel as volunteer registrars in lieu of a paid
staff.156 The EC also scrapped almost all of its voter-education ef-
forts,157 a move that was later widely blamed for the low level of regis-
tration among first-time voters.158
When Kriegler made public these encounters between the EC
and the government, the NNP moved to amend an unrelated com-
149 § 12(2)(b) of Electoral Commission Act 51 of 1996. Kriegler based his opposition in
part on legal advice from senior counsel. Aff. of Johann Christiaan Kriegler 38, New
Nat'l Party.
150 See § 40(e) of Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999 (requiring accounting of-
ficers of constitutional institutions to submit to Parliament annual financial reports).
151 See Aff. of Johann Christiaan Kriegler T 38, New Nat'1 Party (citing opposition to
attempts by DHA to exercise control over EC).
152 See id. 65 (asserting that EC could not perform given tasks on allocated funds).
153 See id. 63 (detailing EC budget discussions with government, including agreement
that 1998-1999 budget "could not reasonably be reduced below" R965 million).
154 See id. Tj 64, 67 (noting initial allocation for 1998-1999 of R500 million, with R100
million added later).
155 See id. 91 69-74 (outlining government-influenced changes to voter registration
plan).
156 See id. TT 69-71 (discussing compromise with government over registration plan).
The result was undertrained registration officials, which led to operational shortcomings
including registration equipment failure and closed registration sites. Id. 1 72. The EC
also was forced to scale back the time allocated for registration from sixteen days spread
over three months, id. T1 73, to nine days per province, see Electoral Comm'n of the Re-
public of S. Afr., supra note 137, at 32-33 (remarking that registration was done in northern
provinces from November 29 to 31, 1998, in southern provinces from December 3 to 5,
1998, and in all provinces from January 29 to 31 and March 5 to 7, 1999).
157 See Aff. of Johann Christiaan Kriegler T 68, New Nat'l Party (stating that with
amount of money given, EC would have to eliminate all voter education).
158 See Cecilia Russell, Kriegler's Election Warning, The Star (Johannesburg), Jan. 28,
1999, http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?setid=l&clickid=79&artid=arch67513be5d332
d3dlb (relating Kriegler's conviction that lack of voter education explains low voter-regis-
tration rate among first-time voters).
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plaint in the Cape Town High Court to seek declaratory relief clarify-
ing the relationship between the EC and the government. 159 This
complaint formed the case New National Party v. Government of the
Republic of South Africa, in which the Constitutional Court addressed
the legality of government actions.160 Kriegler's affidavit in the NNP
case led to more public friction with the government. 161 Kriegler re-
signed on January 26, 1999.162 In an interview given days afterward,
Kriegler explained his dissatisfaction with perceived government in-
terference, claiming that the EC had come to be regarded as a "gov-
ernment-funded agency to run elections, like a meat control
board.' 163 The government responded by accusing Kriegler of re-
sisting legitimate attempts to control the expenditure of government
funds.164
2. NNP v. Government of South Africa
The Constitutional Court ruled on this dispute between the gov-
ernment and the EC in New National Party v. Government of the
Republic of South Africa.165 In this decision, the court defined what it
meant for the EC to be both independent and accountable to the Na-
tional Assembly, holding that the EC was constitutionally entitled to
two forms of independence. 166
First, the court determined that the EC was entitled to financial
independence, defined as an allocation of funding by the National As-
159 See New Nat'l Party v. Govt. of the Republic of S. Afr., 1999 (5) BCLR 489 (CC)
514-15 (detailing amended complaint request). Note that the EC was not a party to the
suit, owing to the "party-political implications of the case." Aff. of Johann Christiaan
Kriegler 4, New Nat'l Party.
160 See Part II.B.2 infra. The original suit claimed the government had violated South
Africans' right to vote and right to free and fair elections by declaring that bar-coded
identifications would be the only form accepted at registration. New Nat'l Party, 1999 (5)
BCLR at 497. It also alleged that the government had interfered with EC independence by
ignoring Commission advice to accept all legal identifications at registration. Id. at 510.
161 A series of letters were exchanged between Kriegler and then Deputy President
Thabo Mbeki, in which Kriegler asserted that EC independence had been compromised;
Mbeki denied the charge. Bitter Kriegler-Mbeki Letters Made Public, The Star (Johannes-
burg), Jan. 29, 1999, http://wwv.iol.co.za/index.php?set-id=l&clickid=13&art_id=arch
4493be5d3159e01e.
162 Tom Lodge & David Pottie, Going, Going, Gone, in South African Election Update:
November 1998-June 1999, supra note 2, at 65, 65.
163 See Russell, supra note 158 (quoting Kriegler). In the interview, Kriegler also stated
his hope that his resignation would spark all election stakeholders to consider the reasons
behind his resignation. Id.
164 Kader Asmal, then Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry, described the DSE's in-
sistence that the EC be subjected to Treasury Instruction K5 as "simply part of a rigorous
process to safeguard public funds." Asmal, supra note 15. He added that the issue "has
nothing to do with independence" and "everything to do with elementary accounting." Id.
165 1999 (5) BCLR 489 (CC).
166 Id. at 524.
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sembly based on its rational consideration of what is required by the
EC, in light of other national interests. 167 As the EC was accountable
to the NA itself, it should have been allowed to defend its budget
requests in front of the NA without executive interference. 168
Second, the court held that the EC also must be given administra-
tive independence, which required it to have control over matters di-
rectly connected with the functions given to it by the constitution and
the EC Act.169 Accordingly, while the EC can enlist the executive's
help in fulfilling its functions, the executive cannot direct the EC's
actions, as it had in forcing the EC to alter its plans for registration
and voter education.170
Given these constitutional directives, administrative practices
that undermined EC independence would have to be changed.17' The
court held that treasury regulations that would give the DHA power
to impose conditions on EC receipt of money fell into this category, as
such rules unconstitutionally undermine financial and administrative
independence. 72
Despite these government encroachments on EC independence,
the court concluded that the independence of Chapter 9 institutions
was not in jeopardy. If the EC, rather than the NNP, had sought de-
claratory relief, the court, as guardian of EC independence, would
167 Id.
168 Id. Thus, the refusal of the DSE or the DHA to allow the EC to speak at budgetary
hearings was not in line with constitutional minimums. Cf. id. at 525 (concluding that
DHA, DSE, and Minister of Finance "failed to appreciate the true import of the require-
ments of the Constitution and the Electoral Commission Act," which provide that EC is
"accountable to the National Assembly and not the executive, and that all other organs of
State must assist and protect it to ensure its independence and effectiveness").
169 Id. at 524-25.
170 Id. at 525 (holding that executive may not tell EC "how to conduct registration,
whom to employ, and so on"); see also supra notes 156-58 and accompanying text (describ-
ing how executive interference changed EC's management plan).
171 Id. at 518 (deciding that constitutional requirement of independence requires shelv-
ing conflicting regulations).
172 Id. at 521-22. Judge Langa also offered a statutory basis for his determination that
the EC is not a line-function of the DHA for accounting purposes. By definition, such a
designation would apply only if the EC's accounting officer were the Director-General of
Home Affairs, but the Electoral Commission Act makes clear this is not so. Id. at 521.
The independence holding is essential to the decision because of the power vested in the
Minister of Finance to change the accounting officer of a constitutional institution in "ex-
ceptional circumstances." See § 36(3) of Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999. While
the Act theoretically might empower the Finance Minister to replace the EC's CEO as
accounting officer with an official from the DHA, such a move would be precluded on
impairment of independence grounds.
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have granted it.173 However, the court ruled that the NNP, as an op-
position party, lacked standing to pursue this constitutional claim. 174
C. 1999 Elections: Improvements with Shortcomings
The second postapartheid South African election was held on
June 2, 1999, and by all accounts it was better organized than the tran-
sitional election. Exit polls showed that eighty-four percent of voters
believed the 1999 elections were better arranged than those in 1994,
with just under ten percent believing the opposite.175 Likewise, oppo-
sition parties viewed the second elections as an improvement on the
first.1
76
Improvement from the administrative breakdowns and fudged
vote counts of 1994 did not mean that the 1999 elections were prob-
lem free. Two major problems pervaded the election process. First,
opposition parties and their supporters accused the EC of systematic
bias towards the ANC at all levels of the Commission. Second, the
EC failed to implement its management plan adequately to devolve
decisionmaking authority to the most local level possible, resulting in
insufficient training and supervision of local officials and organiza-
tional inflexibility.
At the national level, the NNP in particular accused the EC of
ruling for opposition parties on election disputes only when not doing
173 New Nat'l Party, 1999 (5) BCLR at 525; see also Dirk Kotz6, From Transition to
Consolidation: The 1999 South African General Election, 39 Afr. Q. 40,45 (1999) (arguing
that judicial review of election disputes is important new principle established in South
Africa). The court's view of itself as guardian of EC independence may not be surprising,
given the identical constitutional language protecting the independence of the judiciary
and Chapter 9 institutions. As section 165, establishing judiciary independence, and sec-
tion 181, doing the same for Chapter 9 institutions, are worded nearly identically, interpre-
tation of the independence guarantee of section 181 is likely to determine the breadth of
the court's own independence.
174 New Nat'l Party, 1999 (5) BCLR at 526 (ruling that standing rules need not be re-
laxed in absence of evidence that EC cannot assert its own rights).
175 Michael O'Donovan, Election Day Exit Poll, in Democracy South Africa: Evaluat-
ing the 1999 Election, supra note 103, at 33, 41. Six percent of those surveyed did not know
whether there was a difference between the two elections, while one percent found no
difference. Id. It is worth considering, however, that exit polls by their definition exclude
those most disenchanted with the election process-people who did not vote-and as a
result tend to err on the side of positive judgment about an election. Id. at 41-42.
176 The Democratic Party, which emerged as the largest opposition party, asserted that
the 1999 elections were more free and fair than the transitional elections. Richard
Humphries, Assessing the 1999 Election Machinery: Views of Political Parties and Other
Stakeholders, in Democracy South Africa: Evaluating the 1999 Election, supra note 103, at
65, 68. One New National Party (NNP) official said there was little evidence of systematic
vote-rigging in the 1999 election, in contrast to the 1994 contest, in which the NNP esti-
mated that three million fraudulent votes had been cast. Id.
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so would clearly run afoul of the constitution.177 Opposition leaders
argued that this national ANC bias stemmed from two causes. First,
they claimed that the government pressured the Commission into
favoring the ANC, pointing to government actions chastised by the
Constitutional Court in the New National Party decision as evi-
dence. 178 Second, opposition leaders argued that the ANC's constitu-
tional power to appoint and remove commissioners had resulted in
party-line appointments to the EC,179 turning the commissioners into
untrustworthy party-political figures. 180
At the local level, opposition parties (and to a lesser extent, the
ANC) charged that the local election officers (LEOs) hired by the EC
were biased 'towards their respective political parties. 81 They based
these claims on the use of local government officials as LEOs. Town
councils elected on a partisan basis hired local government officials,
usually because of shared political allegiances. 82 Because the ANC
controls most town councils, most local officials were ANC support-
ers, creating a perceived tilt towards the ANC among LEOs.183
177 See Interview with Sheila Camerer, supra note 104 (commenting that commissioners
"don't take decisions to favor the opposition parties unless they are absolutely forced to by
the need to maintain a standard that is required by the Bill of Rights").
178 The Azanian People's Organization (AZAPO), a left-wing opposition party, re-
peated Judge Kriegler's criticism that the involvement of the DHA and DSE in the budget
allocation process undermined EC independence. See Humphries, supra note 176, at 69
(noting AZAPO criticism of DSE involvement in funding EC). Opposition members also
expressed alarm at the DHA's perception that it was politically responsible for the EC.
See Interview with Sheila Camerer, supra note 104 (rebuffing Minister of Home Affairs M.
Buthelezi as "quite wrong" in his perception that EC was line-function of DHA).
179 See Humphries, supra note 176, at 69 (quoting Pan African Congress belief that
commissioners were "'party-political appointees under the guise of government appoin-
tees"' (no internal citation given)); Interview with Sheila Camerer, supra note 104
("[N]obody gets appointed to [Chapter 9] jobs if they are not party supporters."); see also
Jeremy Sarkin, Innovations in the Interim and 1996 South African Constitutions, Int'l
Commission of Jurists Rev., June 1998, at 57, 76 (lamenting Chapter 9 appointment process
as "disappointing" and insufficient to "safeguard against political appointments").
180 AZAPO in particular questioned whether the EC as currently formulated could be
trusted to take an independent and critical approach to election management. See
Humphries, supra note 176, at 69 (remarking on AZAPO's advocacy of more independent
financing for EC and AZAPO's claim that EC sought volunteers from ANC-aligned
organizations).
181 Id. As evidence of bias, opposition leaders pointed to many of these officials frater-
nizing with agents from their party on election day. See Meshack Khosa, Voting in Action:
Focus Group and Workshop Findings, in Democracy South Africa: Evaluating the 1999
Election, supra note 103, at 83, 96 (noting local EC officials ate with party agents, creating
impression they worked with that party). They also noted that one LEO allowed ANC
supporters to place party stickers on queuing voters. Humphries, supra note 176, at 70.
182 See Humphries, supra note 176, at 69 (explaining that because ANC controls major-
ity of town councils, majority of LEOs were from ANC).
183 See id. Similar concerns were voiced by AZAPO and the Freedom Alliance. Id. at
69.
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Not surprisingly, the ANC was far less suspicious of EC motives,
attributing EC deficiencies to a tight time frame rather than systemic
bias.'8 4 This divide between the ANC and opposition parties as to the
extent to which the EC maintained political independence was repli-
cated among supporters of the various parties. A 1999 survey found
that fifty-eight percent of whites, forty-seven percent of Indians, and
thirty-five percent of "coloureds" (the South African term for mixed
race) said they did not trust the EC, compared to just sixteen percent
of blacks. 185 In a country where race is a close proxy for partisan alle-
giance,8 6 such results suggest strong opposition concern about EC
performance not shared by those victorious in the election. 18 7
In addition to real- or perceived-bias problems, some of the ad-
ministrative difficulties that plagued the 1994 election were still pre-
sent. The EC had attempted to reduce election inefficiencies through
implementation of a management plan based on the principle of sub-
sidiarity, using provincial officers to supervise local officials.188 In
practice, however, it retained an extremely top-down management ap-
proach. 8 9 One consequence of centralized decisionmaking was that
the EC did not empower provincial officers sufficiently to allow them
184 Id. at 68.
185 See Linda Ensor, Whites, Indians Distrust Electoral Institutions, Bus. Day (Johan-
nesburg), May 7, 1999, at 5.
186 See ANC Narrowly Misses Two-Thirds Majority in South African Vote, at http://
www.cnn.comWORLD/africa9906IO7safrica.electionl (June 7, 1999) ("Unfortunately ra-
cial politics are still rife in South Africa. The ANC has too few whites and the Democratic
Party has too few blacks.") (quoting Democratic Party Chairman Douglas Gibson).
M87 A March 1999 survey found that sixty-three percent of voters overall trusted the EC,
compared to fifteen percent who distrusted the institution, and seventeen percent who
were ambivalent. Johan Olivier, The Independent Electoral Commission (IEC): The
Quest for Free and Fair Elections, in Democracy South Africa: Evaluating the 1999 Elec-
tion, supra note 103, at 21, 30. The same survey found that seventy percent of voters be-
lieved the EC was neutral, while sixteen percent believed it favored a particular political
party. Fourteen percent of respondents were unsure as to whether the EC was neutral. Id.
at 30-31. Such results may confirm the theory that ANC supporters believe the EC is
independent, while opposition supporters are less certain, as the percentage of those trust-
ing the EC reflects the level of ANC support in the population. See Rule, supra note 103,
at 110 (reporting that ANC received sixty-six percent of vote in 1999 election). But see
O'Donovan, supra note 175, at 36 (noting exit poll where ninety-six percent believed that
election on whole "was conducted freely and fairly").
ISS See Electoral Comm'n of the Republic of S. Afr., supra note 137, at 12 (asserting
that role of provincial officers was to supervise local officials); see also supra note 138
(detailing management plan).
189 See Humphries, supra note 176, at 70 (citing criticism from civil-society group that
EC was too "top-down").
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to take an effective supervisory role.190 Not surprisingly, poorly
trained LEOs remained the biggest source of election breakdowns.1 91
The failure to implement adequately the EC's management plan
had two other troubling consequences. First, because local and pro-
vincial officials did not have the power to adapt national decisions to
local conditions, the national election model was inflexible. 192 As a
result, the EC could not utilize sufficiently those provincial civil-soci-
ety organizations that lacked national counterparts, such as the Elec-
toral Code of Conduct Observer (ECCO) Commission, 193 because
they were not accounted for in the national plan.194 Second, using a
top-down management approach required good communication be-
tween different levels of the EC so that decisions made at the top
could be implemented effectively at the local level. However, the na-
tional EC frequently failed to communicate decisions to provincial
and local bodies, resulting in inconsistent action across provinces. 195
Thus, the EC, while performing better than the IEC, still had seri-
ous problems with government interference, opposition perceptions of
190 See id. at 72-73 (discussing problems created by lack of provincial LEO discretion).
Confusion about the responsibilities of officials at different levels of government generally
impeded implementation of EC directives. See id. at 72 (highlighting conviction of EC
official in Durban that roles of officials at different levels had been defined poorly).
191 For example, at polling sites in the Northern Province and KwaZulu-Natal, polling
officials allegedly failed to seal ballot boxes, removing a major safeguard against voter
tampering. See id. at 70 (recounting reports by officials of one party that in KwaZulu-
Natal ballot boxes were not sealed as required).
192 Electoral Code of Conduct Observer Comm'n, Final Report 1999, at 25 (1999). In
one example of inflexibility, the provincial branches of the EC could not change the struc-
ture or planned meeting times of Conflict Management Committees (CMCs), groups de-
signed to solve conflicts between political parties outside formal channels, to accommodate
local civil-society groups. See id. (describing Electoral Code of Conduct Observer
(ECCO) impression that CMC structure was predetermined, with no real room for re-
gional input); Humphries, supra note 176, at 70 (noting KwaZulu-Natal civil-society group
could not attend CMC meetings).
193 The ECCO Commission was a civil-society organization in KwaZulu-Natal Province
set up by the Provincial Leadership Forum to monitor the implementation of the national
electoral code of conduct in a province plagued by political violence. Electoral Code of
Conduct Observer Comm'n, supra note 192, at 5.
194 See id. at 25 (suggesting reason ECCO was not integrated fully in EC plan was be-
cause only Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal had provincial election monitors, and EC
plan was designed for majority of provinces). No mechanism was created to report back to
provincial civil-society organizations on the results of their work. See id. at 25 (stating that
at time of report, ECCO still did not know which complaints that it referred to CMCs had
been mediated successfully).
195 See Humphries, supra note 176, at 70 (quoting member of left-wing opposition
group, whose views represented views of group generally, as saying "'the left hand of the
IEC did not seem to know what the right hand was doing"' and noting black opposition
party complaint that decisions taken at national level were not well-communicated to
party's provincial officials (no internal citation given)).
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bias, and election inefficiencies. The next Part will explore some sug-
gestions for how these problems can be addressed in the next election.
III
Ti EC IN 2002 AND BEYOND
The last Part revealed two problems plaguing the EC that must
be remedied for any future elections. First, as the experience in 1994
demonstrated, administrative breakdowns can be as corrosive to the
credibility of election results as bias in election management. 196 While
there were fewer technical glitches in the 1999 election, the continued
failure to adequately train and supervise election personnel leaves
open the possibility that election inefficiencies will cloud future elec-
tions.197 Second, to the extent that the EC's constitutional mandate to
administer free and fair elections requires institutional indepen-
dence, 198 the growing opposition perception that the EC is biased to-
wards the ANC must be counteracted. 199 The opposition perceived
EC bias at both the national and local levels, and reforms must be
targeted at ameliorating both perceptions. This Part suggests reforms,
at both the national and local levels, designed to safeguard the EC's
independence and to improve election efficiency.
A. National Level
At the national level, opposition criticism focused on efforts by
the government to influence the EC improperly and the status of com-
missioners as de facto political appointees. 200 As to the former, the
opposition must acknowledge that at least some of the executive's
missteps corrected by the judiciary in New National Party stemmed
from the government's misunderstanding of its role in the oversight of
independent institutions.201 With time, the executive will grow more
comfortable working with an institution that has "no... precedent" in
South Africa.20 2 If the government continues to pressure the EC, the
196 See supra text accompanying note 93.
197 See supra notes 188-91 and accompanying text.
198 See supra note 14.
199 Consider that even if ANC supporters seem likely to view any ANC victory as legiti-
mate, the loss of a similar perception among opposition supporters can result in their with-
drawal from the political process, slowing democratic consolidation. See Linz & Stepan,
supra note 1, at 6 (emphasizing importance to democratic consolidation of "strong majority
of public" committed to political processes).
200 See supra notes 178-80 and accompanying text.
201 See supra note 140 (noting lack of precedent for institution such as EC).
202 See Aff. of Johann Christiaan Kriegler 1 31, New Nat'l Party v. Gov't of the Repub-
lic of S. Afr., 1999 (5) BCLR 489 (CC) (arguing that misunderstandings over government's
role were function of "uniqueness and novelty" of IEC position-both accountable to and
independent from NA).
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Constitutional Court's proclaimed willingness to act against govern-
ment overreaching20 3 should reassure opposition leaders that disputes
will be resolved in line with constitutional minimums.
This solution is not complete for two reasons. First, because only
the EC has standing to challenge government actions, court interven-
tion is limited to cases where the EC brings the government to
court.20 4 Given the political consequences of an EC action against the
government, such actions will be infrequent, meaning most govern-
ment-EC clashes will occur and be resolved outside of the court's su-
pervision.205 Second, even when the court does act, the damage to EC
independence and effectiveness may be done before the court can in-
tervene.20 6 One potential solution is that the EC issue a public report
when it feels the government is impairing its ability to deliver free and
fair elections. 20 7 Such a report could be issued before government ac-
tion has adverse consequences on EC performance and would be less
radical than court action.
Still, commissioners only would issue such a report if they were
willing to confront the party that appointed them. Opposition leaders
are unlikely to have confidence that commissioners will take such a
step as long as they perceive the commissioners to be political appoin-
tees.208 Raising the threshold of National Assembly support required
for appointment and removal of commissioners from simple majority
to the sixty-percent level required for some other independent institu-
tions,20 9 or to the seventy-five-percent level proposed by many of the
political parties during the Constitutional Assembly,210 would help
203 See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
204 See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
205 For example, in spite of the severe incursions into EC independence prior to the
1999 elections, the NNP, not the EC, brought suit against the government. See discussion
supra Part II.B.2. Given that commissioners are de facto majority-party political appoin-
tees, they may be reluctant to challenge the actions of the government. See supra note 180
and accompanying text; see also Lodge & Pottie, supra note 162, at 67 (observing that one
reason for Kriegler resignation was failure of fellow commissioners to support him in bat-
tles with government).
206 By the time the court acted in New National Party, the EC had already been forced
to change its voter education and registration plans to suit the executive's demands. See
supra notes 156-58 and accompanying text.
207 The EC Act gives the EC the power to issue such a report. § 14(4) of Electoral
Commission Act 51 of 1996. The political fallout to the ANC from such a report hopefully
would restrain the executive from attempting to influence the EC.
208 This skepticism may be well placed. For example, most of the EC was unwilling to
support Chairman Kriegler in his battles with the ANC government over institutional inde-
pendence. See supra note 205.
209 See S. Aft. Const. (Constitution Act, 1996) ch. 9, § 193(5)(b)(i) (requiring sixty-per-
cent threshold for appointment of Auditor-General and Public Protector).
210 See South African Constitutional Assembly, Theme Committee 6.1: Electoral Com-
mission 1 (no date) (draft ANC submission) (on file with Constitutional Assembly and the
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combat this perception. A higher threshold would require cross-party
support for commissioners, ensuring greater opposition membership
on the EC.
Such a change to the appointment process presupposes a willing-
ness by parties to compromise first on constitutional change and then
on the selection of commissioners. 211 These compromises may be less
difficult than they may appear. For the ANC, whose victory at the
polls is guaranteed by the high level of support the party enjoys
among the people, fully safeguarding EC independence is politically
positive.212 Increasing opposition membership on the EC will elimi-
nate an avenue of opposition criticism of election results. Opposition
leaders who support a higher threshold have signaled their recognition
that even under such a system, no commissioner opposed by the ANC
would be selected.21 3
Ameliorating election inefficiencies, while largely attributable to
the incompetence of local officials, will also require national action in
the form of aggressively implementing a management plan based on
the principle of subsidiarity.2 14 Such a plan should empower provin-
cial officials sufficiently to allow them to supervise LEOs effec-
tively.215 Provincial empowerment is also critical in order to permit
regional variations in the national election-management plan, which
would allow the EC to take better advantage of provincial or regional
civil-society organizations, like the ECCO, that have been underutil-
ized in the past.21 6 Implementing this type of plan requires an im-
provement in communication between levels of the EC,2 17
encouraging the exchange of ideas necessary for successful devolution
of decisionmaking authority.
New York University Law Review); South African Constitutional Assembly, Theme Com-
mittee Six, Subtheme Committee 6.1: Election Commission 1 (Nat'l Party preliminary sub-
mission) (1995) (on file with Constitutional Assembly and the New York University Law
Review).
211 An amendment of the South African Constitution requires a two-thirds vote in the
National Assembly, S. Afr. Const. (Constitution Act, 1996) ch. 4, § 74(3)(a), which cannot
be attained without ANC support.
212 Cf. Interview with Sheila Camerer, supra note 104, (expressing her surprise that
ANC does not view EC independence as political plus). Political-process-lockup theory,
however, suggests that the ANC's incentive to undermine the EC was the maintenance of
its electoral advantage, an incentive that remains today. See supra note 36.
213 See Interview with Sheila Camerer, supra note 104 (accepting that even under
higher-threshold model, no commission candidate opposed by ANC could be appointed).
214 See supra notes 93, 93, 138, 188-91 and accompanying text (discussing efforts by IEC
and then EC to implement such plan).
215 See supra note 190 and accompanying text (noting failure of provincial officers to
supervise LEOs adequately in 1999).
216 See supra note 192-94 and accompanying text.
217 See supra note 195 (addressing communication difficulties in 1999).
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B. Reforms at the Local Level
At the local level, both the ANC and the opposition have criti-
cized the partisanship of local government officials who serve as
LEOs.218 Some experts have suggested that the best way to amelio-
rate this problem is to return election administration to the govern-
ment, reconfiguring the EC as a monitoring body.2 19 Advocates of
such a change can claim two advantages. First, since local government
officials cannot be replaced as LEOs and given the shortage of people
with adequate managerial and administrative skill in many municipali-
ties, the administration of elections will have partisan elements. 220
Therefore, these commentators suggest the EC should recognize this
fact and include election management within the normal duties of lo-
cal government employees.221 This reallocation of duties would free
the EC to serve as a watchdog body, whose central competence would
be rooting out bias,222 with the DHA left to supervise directly local
officials. Second, once the EC was freed from the responsibility of
administering elections, it could focus on voter education, electoral
research, prosecution of electoral violations in the courts, and ulti-
mately certifying the election as free and fair, some of which the EC
has shortchanged in the past.223
Such a reassignment of duties would run into severe problems.
Certification of an election as free and fair, separate from adjudication
of claims brought by stakeholders, faces the difficulty that there would
be no accepted international or South African standards defining
"free and fair. '2 24 This problem led the IEC to recommend that a
218 See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
219 See Tom Lodge, What Sort of IEC Can We Afford?, in South African Election Up-
date: November 1998-June 1999, supra note 2, at 68, 69 (arguing for election administra-
tion to be relocated to government with EC as monitoring body); Interview with Judge
Dennis Davis, supra note 54 (same).
220 See Lodge, supra note 219, at 68-69 (remarking that employing town officials is not
to save money, but because no other alternative exists).
221 See id. at 69.
222 See Interview with Judge Dennis Davis, supra note 54 (arguing EC's primary ability
is as a "monitoring body"). Judge Davis, member of the Kempton Park Technical Commit-
tee, which drafted the 1993 IEC Act, asserts that such an EC would enforce its monitoring
duties through its power to deny certification of an election as free and fair. Id.
223 For example, post-election analysis widely blamed the EC for not doing a better job
at voter education. See Yvonne Muthien & Meshack Khosa, Conclusion: Exercising
Democratic Citizenship Through Voting: Policy Implications, in Democracy South Africa:
Evaluating the 1999 Election, supra note 103, at 129, 131-32 (suggesting better-funded
voter education should be central to EC tasks); David Pottie, The IEC Takes Stock, in
South African Election Update: November 1998-June 1999, supra note 2, at 323. 323
(opining that late promulgation of regulations undermined voter education effort).
224 See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
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future commission not take such a role.225 Even if some such stan-
dards could be devised, however, it seems unlikely that the DHA
would be able to serve as any check at all on LEO partisan behavior.
The line between the state and the party of government has been
blurred by a series of one-party dominated governments, making it
unlikely that DHA officials could separate their role as state actors
from their partisan obligations.22 6
Improvement in the training of LEOs may prove the best way to
turn local government officials into professional administrators; in-
creased skill levels will result in reduced inefficiencies.2 27 Improving
training requires several steps. First, a national training forum should
be established to ensure uniform standards in staff training.2 28 Sec-
ond, creation of an election guide or manual as a repository of elec-
tion expertise would assist in such efforts. Since elections are held
only once in five years, such a manual could compensate for officials
lost through personnel changes. Third, training must include perform-
ance evaluations to weed out bad performers. For such evaluations to
work, the LEOs must be paid by the EC, allowing the EC to hold
local officials accountable.22 9
CONCLUSION
A critical evaluation of South Africa's experience with electoral
commissions can provide guidance to the country moving forward, as
225 Id.
226 Some commentators have maintained that the ANC deliberately has blurred the line
between state and party by making political appointments to the civil service, independent
state bodies, and local government. See Hermann Giliomee et al., Dominant Party Rule,
Opposition Parties and Minorities in South Africa, in Opposition and Democracy in South
Africa 161, 172 (Roger Southall ed., 2001) (outlining ANC political appointments to
independent statutory bodies and local government administration). These party figures
are bound by the ANC doctrine of democratic centralism, which dictates that all party
members, no matter where they serve, remain under the direction of the central party
leadership. Id. Accordingly, some argue, real decisionmaking authority in state institu-
tions lies with the ANC party leadership. See id. at 173 (commenting on blurred distinc-
tion between party and state); see also Murphy, supra note 7, at 25 (observing blurred line
between party and government in apartheid South Africa, in view of disenfranchised
majority).
227 See supra notes 68-70, 191 and accompanying text (discussing problems arising from
lack of skilled local officials).
228 See Pottie, supra note 223, at 324 (detailing post-election suggestions for improve-
ment of EC staff).
229 This was the management model Kriegler sought to employ before interference from
the executive. The EC planned to use registration as "dress rehearsals" for the election to
allow EC to gauge staff performance, eliminate weak performers, and strengthen the skills
of those who performed well, in the hope of ultimately improving administrative efficiency.
Aff. of Johann Christiaan Kriegler 74, New Nat'l Party v. Gov't of the Republic of S.
Afr., 1999 (5) BCLR 489 (CC).
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well as to other transitional democracies, on how best to structure
their election administration. An easy inference to draw from the fact
that postapartheid elections have produced winners considered legiti-
mate by all segments of society is that this was due to the credible
management of the electoral process by South Africa's electoral com-
missions. However, the reality is that the relatively low expectations
of a population happy to be free of apartheid have led the people to
forgive large-scale process failures.
That forbearance is already waning among minority voters230 and
cannot be expected to last forever even among black voters. The cen-
tral challenge for the Electoral Commission will be to meet rising ex-
pectations. This Note has argued that to do so, the EC must address
opposition perceptions that it is biased towards the ruling party before
those perceptions begin to undermine the credibility of ANC victo-
ries. In addition to safeguarding independence, the EC also must im-
prove its competency in administering elections to minimize the risk
of future large-scale breakdowns creating a crisis of confidence in
election results. Instituting such reforms will be essential if the EC is
to continue to play an important role in legitimizing election results
and furthering democratic consolidation.
230 See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
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